The Political and Institutional Context of President Yoon’s Removal
By Sunhong Min, Rapporteur judge, Constitutional Court of Korea
On 4 April 2025, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea (“the Court”) removed President Yoon from office for the second time (Case No. 2024Hun-Na8), nearly eight years after it had removed President Park (Case No. 2016Hun-Na1). In both cases, the Court concluded that the need to safeguard the Constitution clearly outweighed the national loss that removal would cause—even acknowledging that the presidency carries democratic legitimacy conferred directly by the people. Such a judgment is never easy, but this time the decision was even more difficult. A combination of political and institutional factors complicated the Court’s task—factors I will outline in this post. My aim is to shed light on the context in which the decision was rendered, in the hope that it will help readers appreciate the judgment from multiple perspectives.
Political Background, Martial Law Declaration, and the Impeachment Resolution
President Yoon, the candidate of the conservative People Power Party (hereafter, PPP), was elected in March 2022. At the time, the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (hereafter, DP), a liberal party, already held a majority in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (hereafter, the Assembly), and it increased its majority further in the 2024 legislative elections, exacerbating political conflict.
On 3 December 2024, at 22:27, President Yoon declared martial law, citing a national emergency stemming from what he described as the opposition-led Assembly’s tyrannical behaviour—namely, its aggressive pursuit of impeachment, unilateral exercise of legislative authority, and attempts to drastically reduce the government budget. (In the decision, the Court acknowledged certain aspects of the Assembly’s conduct but rejected the President’s claim that the situation constituted a national emergency.) He deployed military and police forces to restrict members’ access to the Assembly and ordered them to be forcibly removed. As a result, some legislators resorted to climbing over fences or were entirely prevented from entering the premises. Despite this, the Assembly managed to pass a resolution calling for the repeal of martial law around 01:00 on 4 December. President Yoon rescinded the martial law order at approximately 04:30.
The Assembly has the authority to pass motions for impeachment, while the Court determines whether the individual against whom the motion has been passed should be removed from office. An initial impeachment motion against President Yoon, submitted by members of DP on the basis of the declaration of martial law and subsequent actions, failed to reach a vote on 7 December. However, a second motion, submitted a week later, was passed with 204 votes in favour, 85 against, 8 invalid votes, and 3 abstentions—indicating that at least 12 members from PPP supported the resolution. Under the Korean Constitution, once an impeachment motion is passed, the President is suspended from exercising presidential powers until the Court adjudicates the matter.
Composition of the Court and the Legitimacy of Its Decisions
The Court was unable to constitute a full bench in adjudicating this case. The Court normally consists of nine Justices, each serving a six-year term. Three are nominated by the National Assembly and appointed by the President; another three are nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and likewise appointed by the President. The remaining three are directly appointed by the President.
On 17 October 2024, the terms of the three Justices nominated by the Assembly expired. The Assembly failed to select replacements before the impeachment motion was passed, leaving the Court with only six sitting Justices. Although a decision to remove the President by impeachment requires the concurrence of six or more Justices and was thus procedurally possible, concerns about legitimacy were raised. Had the Court rejected the impeachment by a narrow margin (e.g. a 3–3 split), critics could have argued that the outcome might have been different had all nine Justices been seated.
On 26 December 2024, the Assembly selected three new Justices, fulfilling constitutional requirements with a majority of the total members present and a majority of those voting. However, Prime Minister Han, who was serving as Acting President at the time, refused to appoint them, citing a lack of bipartisan agreement.
The following day, the Assembly passed a motion to impeach Han, citing among other grounds his refusal to appoint the Justices (Case No. 2024Hun-Na9). The new Acting President, Minister of Economy and Finance Choi, appointed only two of the three selected candidates—one recommended by DP and the other by PPP—leaving the remaining DP-nominated Justice unappointed.
On 3 January 2025, the Assembly filed a competence dispute, arguing that Minister Choi’s refusal to appoint the final Justice infringed its constitutional authority. On 27 February, the Court unanimously upheld this claim (Case No. 2025Hun-Ra1). Separately, in the impeachment case against Han (Case No. 2024Hun-Na9), the Court ruled on 24 March that his refusal to appoint the three Justices had violated the Constitution. Nevertheless, Minister Choi continued to withhold the appointment of the remaining Justice.
This situation highlights an institutional dilemma: despite two decisions from the Court affirming the Assembly’s authority, the Acting President disregarded its rulings. The only remaining constitutional remedy—initiating impeachment proceedings against the Acting President—carried the risk of further destabilising the political order, particularly given that two impeachment motions had already been passed against both the President and the Acting President.
Ultimately, the Court adjudicated the case with eight Justices. Media coverage emphasised the potential difficulty in justifying a rejection of impeachment if five Justices voted in favour, as critics could argue that the presence of the unappointed Justice might have changed the outcome. Fortunately, the Court reached a unanimous decision, yet the broader questions about its composition and the efficacy of its rulings persist.
The Survival of the Court
Although the system of ordinary courts—hearing civil, criminal, family, administrative, and military cases—has existed since the first Korean Constitution of 1948, the Constitutional Court, vested with jurisdiction over the constitutionality of statutes, constitutional complaints, competence disputes, impeachments, and the dissolution of political parties, was established much later, in 1988, under the Tenth Constitution enacted after the democratic reforms of 1987. While the abolition of ordinary courts remains virtually unthinkable, the very existence of the Constitutional Court has come under question during this crisis.
When the Court ruled to impeach former President Park, public opinion was strongly supportive, with approval at 77% and opposition at 18%. This time, however, the numbers were 60% in favour and 34% against, according to a poll conducted by the same institution. On 19 January 2025, protesters stormed the Seoul Western District Court after it issued an arrest warrant against President Yoon for his declaration of martial law. Some of Yoon’s supporters—including constitutional law scholars—warned that the Court would ‘crumble to dust’ if it were to decide in favour of impeachment. Meanwhile, pro-impeachment groups, frustrated by what they perceived as judicial delay, began questioning the Court’s usefulness.
In truth, when a nation stands at the edge of crisis, the continued existence of any single institution may seem a lesser concern. The intense pressure placed on the Court underscores the gravity of the issues at stake. Regardless, the Court has survived. Whether this is due to the substantive justifiability of the decision’s merits or the procedural characteristics of the Court is a matter worth analysing. Moreover, the question of which institution should decide such a case amid intense public pressure demands thorough academic analysis and open public debate.