A Theory of Recognition of Women and Case Studies
Carolina Esser’s new book, Recognized Women: A Theory of Recognition of Women and Case Studies, has been published with Springer as part of the Juridicum – Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie series. Esser, who completed her doctoral thesis at the Paris Lodron Salzburg University, explores the recognition of women in legal and philosophical contexts. In this blog post, she shares insights into her research and the key themes of her book.
RELEVANCE
The book stands out for its relevance in addressing key societal issues, such as gender equality and interculturality, drawing on author’s experiences working with human rights in China and Morocco. It offers a critical perspective on the theory of recognition while analyzing concepts like solidarity and the complex debates on interculturalism within liberalism and communitarianism. Breaking away from the European tradition of philosophical thought, the book proposes a groundbreaking view of indifference as a social pathology, shedding light on its profound impacts on contemporary society.
CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF RECOGNITION
According to the European sociologist and philosopher Axel Honneth, the recognition of a person as a self-confident, self-respected, and self-esteemed individual happens through three dimensions of personality: needs and emotions (primary relationships of recognition), moral responsibility (legal relations of recognition), and traits and abilities (community of value)[1]. In other words, it occurs within three perspectives: a private sphere of life including family and friendships – pattern of love, where the person is recognized as a family member and as part of private relationships of love and care; and two public spheres of life – pattern of law, where the person is recognized as a legal person, being the addressee and author of rights; and pattern of solidarity, where a person is recognized as a member of a community of value through empathy and solidarity within the group[2]. Each pattern of recognition must follow certain conditions to allow an individual to reach self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect.
During the process of identity formation of an individual, she may experience offenses to the patterns of recognition, and then struggles should begin to recover her recognition.
In the context of discussing how recognition can be achieved, Honneth indicates that struggles always accompany recognition[3]. There is no recognition without struggling for it.
PROBLEMS
Despite the attempt to build a theory of recognition based on private and public aspects of life, Axel Honneth did not sufficiently take into consideration discussions on gender equality, specifically regarding the recognition of women and how the patterns of could be interpreted from a gender equality perspective. Furthermore, Honneth did not clarify how cultural differences can influence recognition, and how culture plays a role in the building of female identity. I analyze and assess Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition from gender and intercultural perspectives.
Honneth does not clarify how exactly individuals should struggle for recognition, especially in contexts where their freedom to develop their identity may be limited – for instance, I could mention a non-democratic country, where the freedom of expression for women does not exist at all.
Besides the lack of sufficient proposals and clarifications about the struggles, Honneth does not approach a more specific dimension: a struggle for gender equality and the recognition of women. Women, mainly in the pattern of love, are more vulnerable to experiencing disrespect and misrecognition[1]. Honneth’s theory of recognition does not allow women’s complete and reasonable achievement of recognition. An analysis of the patterns and other elements of recognition may show that it is not possible to build a model of recognition of women yet. Considering that, the book asks:
- Why is Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition not reasonable for women’s recognition?
- How can his theory be modified to fully include the recognition of women?
PROPOSALS
A model of recognition of women may be built through specific struggles for the recognition of women, with support coming from the pattern of law. The book introduces proposals for struggles for recognition in the patterns of love, law, and solidarity, highlighting the role of law for the recognition of women. It is inquired which struggles are able to exist in all three patterns of recognition. The answer is: a struggle against indifference.
The book clarifies that indifference can be interpreted as a behavior and a feeling; being neutral, positive or negative; intentional or unintentional. I comprehend struggles against indifference as a negative intentional feeling and behavior.
Indifference is a major motivating factor of disrespect of women, offending practices of solidarity, and damaging the recognition. The book argues that the individuals should confront the indifference they feel inside themselves. The first struggle to happen is the one inside oneself, when feelings of indifference are replaced by solidarity, compassion, affection, and care.
The book also proposes struggles in the pattern of love, inside the contexts of family and friendship. Within these contexts, individuals should struggle for the emancipation of the family member and for the open revisability of a culture.
After proposing struggles in the pattern of love, the pattern of law is interpreted as a primary support for all the patterns of recognition, promoting the preservation of the necessary elements of women’s recognition.
The role of legal recognition is analyzed especially through human rights. A society cannot reach social freedom by either only meeting public ethical requirements related to material resources or to the participation in deliberative private and public spaces, meeting successful private experiences of love and care such as family and friendship, for instance. Instead, both must exist. The formation of human beings’ identity comes from psychological – more precisely, emotional – individual claims, and shared public ethics – specific provisions related to material resources, the inclusion in a public deliberative space, and the fulfillment of individual emotional needs within the entire community. Considering that, all societies should comply with recognition in both perspectives: public and private, supported by legal recognition.
Commonly, theorists focus just on public dimensions of justice. They forget to consider the private spheres of recognition as well, related to the private life of individuals, in their family and friendship circles. Furthermore, the primary agents of justice should be the human beings themselves, and not the commonly discussed legal institutes or state institutions. Additionally, justice should be analyzed from an intercultural perspective, in order to promote the philosophy of law as a more fruitful and realistic science, instead of studies based mainly on Western paradigms.
To turn recognition into real practices of justice and respect of women, some human rights are specially highlighted, which would facilitate the identification of recognition and disrespect in different cultures, including the non-Western societies.
Sequentially, the book proposes struggles in the pattern of solidarity. It is highlighted the relevance of the concept of solidarity and its relation to the theory of recognition. The struggles in this pattern hold a confrontation of indifference as a social pathology. Besides the interpretation of indifference as a feeling and behavior, it is also comprehended as the most influential social pathology that nowadays damages social justice and recognition. If the members of society continue to ignore that other human beings are being victims of exploitation and violations of fundamental human rights, they will never be able to guarantee the realization of justice. If they let social justice be a task only for lawyers, philosophers, and government, they neglect to develop the most significant power worldwide: the power of people’s actions.
CASE STUDIES
After the study of Honnethian recognition from a theoretical perspective and also proposals of modifications to the theory, the book illustrates recognition and struggles through case studies. The case studies iluminates how the pattern of law relates to the achievement of women’s recognition, taking it from an intercultural approach[1].
Although China and Morocco are vastly different, the offenses to the recognition of women there make the demographic distinctions not necessarily significant. Case studies show that Chinese and Moroccan women usually keep their family and love relationships private, and when they experience some offense to recognition – for instance, domestic violence, usually these practices are not denounced or sanctioned as a result of social indifference. Furthermore, although both countries are examples of a system of rights under constant development within their regional contexts, the recent reforms in their legislation do not contribute to the achievement of women’s recognition at all. It is evaluated why the legal reforms in both countries have not been sufficient to guarantee women’s recognition.
The study of China and Morocco contemplates their legal norms and constitution during their history with a focus on human rights. International reports – such as the ones from the United Nations – are also analyzed as an official data source.
The research has a unique relevance, as access to sources regarding China and Morocco is limited because of state restrictions on research and documentation. Nevertheless, the study will introduce unpresented data from observations experienced by Carolina Esser through her research, relationships, interviews, and conversations with Chinese and Moroccan people. I can mention, for instance, an interview with a Chinese activist in Shanghai, which provided a lot of unprecedented information on the historical-legal background of gender equality activism in China. Furthermore, in Morocco, Carolina Esser has worked on observations and collection of data during a voluntary internship at Centre Batha, a multifunctional center sponsored by Unesco, for the support and empowerment of women victims of gender-based violence.
The book points out different forms of disrespect that Chinese and Moroccan women experience daily. The influence of patriarchalism in both cultures makes women be respected only when they get married and give birth. There is a low level of freedom for them to decide if they want to marry or be mothers.
CONCLUSION
The possibility to analyze the Honnethian theory of recognition contributes, firstly, to the improvement of the legal-philosophical paradigm, expanding it from Western to non-Western contexts. The research intends to break the tradition of legal-philosophical studies, which usually do not effectively approach societies outside the West.
The book contributes to a reinterpretation of the theory of recognition from the perspective of gender equality, analyzing each element and pattern of recognition, and proposing forms of overcoming the shortcomings that the theory still holds.
Finding ways to increase recognition of women would reduce a shared indifference that interferes with all patterns of recognition. It would be sustained by specific human rights, which correlate with forming women’s identity through love, law, and solidarity. Instead of relying only on changes in the form of government, regime, rule of law, or division of powers, individuals should take more active accountability in achieving women’s recognition. The work contends that struggles are more than just public movements, especially in dealing with case studies in societies where public protests and political marches are limited – for instance, in China and Morocco.
The book reaches the objectives of clarifying why Honneth’s recognition is not yet ready to allow a complete model of recognition of women; and to propose the necessary changes to his theory, to promote gender equality from an intercultural point of view, with support coming from legal recognition.
Carolina Esser holds a Ph.D. in Legal Theory from the University of Salzburg, with a focus on women rights and interculturalism. As a lawyer and educator, she has worked across countries, including China, Morocco, Germany, and Brazil. Currently residing in Hannover, Carolina Esser leverages her expertise in human rights to influence corporate practices and promote social responsibility
[1] “Interculturalism makes a comparison between cultures (extra group analysis). On the other hand, multiculturalism examines a specific culture, country, city, or community, with a focus on the minorities, that live inside there – intragroup analysis -”. (Kymlicka 1995, 18)
[1] Okin 1999, 5.
[1] Honneth 1995, 129.
[2] “The only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities. The scope of such traits – and hence the extent of one’s positive relation-to-self – increases with each new form of recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects. In this way, the prospect of basic self-confidence is inherent in the experience of love; the prospect of self-respect, in the experience of legal recognition; and finally the prospect of self-esteem, in the experience of solidarity.” (Honneth 1995, 173)
[3] Honneth 1995, 168.