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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We express our deep appreciation to the donors who have supported the 3<sup>rd</sup> annual conference of SAFI on RESPONSIBILITY.

This conference takes place **in cooperation** with IXDeae (Novae Deae) APS, and with the two research Centers of the Department of Human Sciences of the University of Verona "Asklepios" and "Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica".

**With the patronage** of: Provincia di Verona and Europe Direct-Provincia di Verona; Comune di Verona; Comune di Bosco Chiesanuova; Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Milan; Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici; Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici; Società Italiana di Filosofia Morale; SWIP Italia; Goethe-Zentrum Verona; Gender Interuniversity Observatory.

**With the support** of the following publishers: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag; Duncker & Humblot; Velbrück Wissenschaft Verlag; Nomos.

We also extend our sincere gratitude to this large number of donors, individuals and volunteers who have contributed to the conference.

*Giulia Battistoni and the organization team*

## FOREWORD

The topic "Responsibility", to which the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Conference of SAFI is dedicated, is all the more important and urgent in this first twenty years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially because it is addressed by a "choir" of female voices representing the excellence of the world academic research.

The episodes happening in Iran these days (women of all ages protesting against denied rights and freedoms) show, once again, that women know how to make those decisions that constitute "turning points" in history. They know how to be - in the deepest sense of the concept - "responsible", that is, how to respond to the demand for values that require both personal and collective commitment, sacrifices and self-denial (the emotional and existential "weight" of "moral choices"). This is the heart - as in primordial myths - of the great "garden of life".

Having taken part in the realization of this very important SAFI event as the Director of the Center "Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica" of the Department of Human Sciences of the University of Verona (of which the main Italian organizer of this conference, Dr. Giulia Battistoni, is a precious collaborator), is a real source of pride.

My most sincere greetings and deepest gratitude go to all the participants of the conference.

*Take care of us.*

**Prof. Davide Poggi**, Director of the Center "Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica"

(<https://sites.dsu.univr.it/rgm/>)



## ABOUT VERONA AND BOSCO CHIESANUOVA

**Verona** sits on the banks of the Adige River in Veneto, Italy, gathering about 257,264 inhabitants. It is one of the seven provincial capitals of the region. It is one of the main tourist destinations in northern Italy because of its artistic heritage and several annual fairs and shows. Moreover, it is worldwide famous for the ancient Roman amphitheater, the Arena, which is still used today to host large-scale opera performances.

**Bosco Chiesanuova** is a municipality in the Province of Verona, part of the communities which historically speak the Cimbrian language, deriving from a Bavarian dialect. In 1287 the Bishop of Verona, Bartolomeo della Scala, granted the representatives of about fifty families of German origin to settle in this territory. Thus began the spread of these German speakers who designate themselves as zimberer, i.e., woodcutters. Bosco extends along the Mountains of Lessinia and is part of the Lessinia Regional Natural Park, established with the aim of protecting the rich naturalistic, environmental, historical and ethnic heritage of the area.

## VENUE

29 <sup>th</sup> September	Verona, Loggia di Fra' Giocondo, Piazza dei Signori 1
30 <sup>th</sup> September & 1 <sup>st</sup> October	Bosco Chiesanuova, Teatro Vittoria, Piazza Guglielmo Marconi, 35

## TRANSPORTATION

You will find all information about the transfer from Verona to Bosco Chiesanuova and vice versa on the website dedicated to the conference: <https://safi-network.org/verona-2022/>.



## INFORMATION ON SITE



You will find our SAFI CONFERENCE-table with all information you might need on our SAFI website: <https://safi-network.org>.



## KEYNOTES

### MARINA CALLONI

#### Responsibility: Human Development and Sustainability



Marina Calloni is full Professor of Social Political and Philosophy at the University of Milano-Bicocca. She has taught in numerous countries, participated in cross-border researches and collaborated with supranational institutions. She is deputy president of the Italian Society of Political Philosophy and director of the research center ADV - Against Domestic Violence. She has published more than 260 works on human rights, citizenship, gender studies, critical theory of society, research networks and international cooperation. Among them: *Gender Politics and Democracy in Post-socialist Europe* (with Galligan and Clavero, 2007); *Chiedo asilo. Essere rifugiato in Italia* (with Marras and Serughetti, 2012); *Il ruolo dell'Università nella lotta alla violenza di genere* (2021). She was nominated by the President Mattarella "Officer of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic". For further information: <https://www.unimib.it/marina-calloni>.

Photo credit: <https://sifp.it/soci/marina-calloni/>

29<sup>th</sup> September 2022 | 9.30-11.00 | Sala del Consiglio

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### JUDITH BUTLER

#### Toward a Feminist Politics of Judgment



Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of several books, which have been translated into more than twenty-seven languages. Among them: *Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death* (2000), *Precarious Life: Powers of Violence and Mourning* (2004); *Undoing Gender* (2004), *The Force of Nonviolence* (2020). Butler was the recipient of the Andrew Mellon Award for Distinguished Academic Achievement in the Humanities (2009-13). She was awarded the Adorno Prize from the City of Frankfurt (2012) in honor of her contributions to feminist and moral philosophy, the Brudner Prize from Yale University for lifetime achievement in gay and lesbian studies. She has received twelve honorary degrees. In 2014, she was awarded the diploma of Chevalier of the Order of Arts and Letters from the French Cultural Ministry.

Photo and text: <https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/faculty/judith-butler>

30<sup>th</sup> September 2022 | 17.30-19.00 | Teatro Vittoria

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## ERZSÉBET RÓZSA

### Verantwortung in Ágnes Hellers Philosophie



Erzsébet Rózsa is Professor Emerita at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Debrecen. Since 2010 she has headed the interdisciplinary research group of bioethics. Her main research areas are: German idealism, Hegel, practical philosophy, applied philosophy, bioethics, philosophy of G. Lukács and the Budapest School. Among her main publications/monographs: *Hegel's Economic Philosophy* (1993, in Hungarian); *Ágnes Heller - Philosophies of Fronesis* (1997, in Hungarian); *Versöhnung und System* (2005); *Hegels Konzeption praktischer Individualität* (2007); *The prose of the modern world* (2009, in Hungarian); *Modern Individuality in Hegel's Practical Philosophy* (2012); *Autonomy and paternalism. Ethical Problems in the Doctor-Patient Relationship in Modern Medicine* (2017, in Hungarian).


Photo credit: [https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rózsa\\_Erzsébet](https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rózsa_Erzsébet)

1<sup>st</sup> October 2022 | 17.30-19.00 | Teatro Vittoria

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With the participation of

## ADRIANA CAVARERO



Adriana Cavarero is Honorary Professor at the Department of Human Sciences of the University of Verona, where she taught political philosophy. She was a visiting professor at NY University, Harvard, University of California at Berkley and others. Her field of research includes classical, modern and contemporary thought, with a focus on the political significance of philosophy. The main concerns that shape her approach to the Western philosophical tradition are: 1. the 'thought of sexual difference', a theoretical perspective that enables the deconstruction of Western textuality from a feminist standpoint; 2. the thought of Hannah Arendt. Among her books: *Horrorism* (2008); *Toward a feminist ethics of nonviolence* (with Butler and Honig, 2021); *Surging Democracy. Notes on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought* (2021).

Photo and text:

<https://www.dsu.univr.it/?ent=persona&id=727&lang=it#tab-didattica>.

29<sup>th</sup> September 2022 | 17.15-19.15 | Sala del Consiglio

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# PROGRAMME

**29<sup>th</sup> September** | Loggia di Fra' Giocondo, Verona

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**8.45 | Registration**

**9.15 | Sala del Consiglio**  
**Greetings and Congress beginning**

**9.30-11.00 | KEYNOTE MARINA CALLONI | Sala del Consiglio**

**Moderator:** *Sabrina Zucca-Soest* (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

**Keynote speaker:** *Marina Calloni* (University of Milano-Bicocca), *Responsibility: Human Development and Sustainability*

**11.00 break**

**11.15-13.15 | PANELS 1 & 2**

**Panel 1: Responsibility, causation and climate crisis | Sala del Consiglio**

**Moderator:** *Giulia Battistoni* (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici/University of Verona)

*Sarah Hiller* (Free University of Berlin/Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), *Responsibility without causation - Probability raising as an independent desert base*

*Friederike Hartz* (University of Cambridge), *Changing responsibilities in a warming world: Climate science and its role in activism*

**Panel 2: Reflections on moral and legal responsibility | Sala Rossa**

**Moderator:** *Giorgio Erle* (University of Verona)

*Lucia Vantini* (University of Verona), *L'intreccio tra etica della cura e antropologia della vulnerabilità: un'altra grammatica della giustizia*

*Vittoria Franco* (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa), *Responsabilità come dotazione di soggettività*

*Ana C. Gómez* (Purdue University), *Conditions of legal responsibility: the case of Colombia*

**13.15 lunch break**

**15.15-17.15 | PANEL 3**

**Panel 3: Responsibility and vulnerability |** Sala del Consiglio

**Moderator:** **Alma Diamond** (New York University School of Law)

**Hamza Safouane** (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *A claim for agency: From guests to hosts in Jordan's refugee camps - Notes from the field*

**Birte de Gruisbourne** (Institute of Media Studies, University of Paderborn), *Inclination, responsibility and the autonomizing structure of care*

**Hannah Vögele** (Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics, University of Brighton), *My body, my responsibility? Bodily self-ownership, vulnerability and responsibility*

**17.15 - 19.15 | PANEL 4**

**Panel 4: Responsibility and vulnerability |** Sala del Consiglio

**Moderator:** **Adriana Cavarero** (University of Verona)

**Valentina Surace** (University of Messina), *Judith Butler: la responsabilità al di là dei limiti della sola legge e del volere libero*

**Timothy J. Huzar** (King's College London), *Being present to vulnerability: Uniqueness and responsibility in Butler, Cavarero and Lewis*

**Alicia Valdés** (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), *The act of coalitions. A political praxis from vulnerability and responsibility*

**9.15-11.15 | PANELS 5 & 6**

**Panel 5: Intersections** | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Kristin Albrecht** (University of Salzburg)

**Carla Bagnoli** (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), *Responsibility and oppressive coercion*

**Sabrina Zucca-Soest** (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *Verantwortung und Konsens*

**Atoosa Kasirzadeh** (University of Edinburgh), *Algorithmic fairness and structural injustice: insights from feminist political philosophy*

**Panel 6: Responsibility and vulnerability** | Sala Olimpica

**Moderator:** **Claudia Wirsing** (Humboldt University of Berlin/Technical University of Braunschweig)

**Luke Edmeads** (University of Brighton), *Vulnerability and suffering: Mimetic relations of responsibility in Butler and Adorno*

**Michaela Bstieler** (University of Innsbruck), *Radikale Alterität und Verantwortung. Eine ethisch-politische Relektüre mit Levinas und Butler*

**Sandra Göttische** (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *Taking responsibility. Reducing refugees' structural vulnerabilities accessing social services*

**11.15 break**

**11.30-13.30 | PANELS 7 & 8**

**Panel 7: Reflections on moral responsibility** | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Chiara Magni** (University of Roma Tre/Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)

**Maja Berseneva** (Freie Universität Berlin), *The responsible relationship of self and other in Levinas*

**Edoardo Poli** (University of Pisa), *Un invito alla vulnerabilità: per un'etica del perdono*

**Alix Stéphan** (University College Dublin), *The conditions of responsibility: Derrida and Kierkegaard in front of the call of the Other*

**Panel 8: Responsibility in psychology and psychoanalysis** | Sala Olimpica

**Moderator:** **Mirko Gagnato** (Novae Deae)

**Elena D'Amore** (University of Pisa), *Gioco e responsabilità*

**Caterina Marino** (University of Calabria), *La responsabilità impossibile dopo e oltre Freud*

**Giulia Castagliuolo/Paolo Olgiati** (University of Bologna/University of Torino), *La responsabilità come presupposto dell'alleanza terapeutica: gli effetti della medicina difensiva in psichiatria*

## 13.30 lunch break

## 15.15-17.15 | PANELS 9 & 10

### **Panel 9: Foundations of responsibility** | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Carlo Chiurco** (University of Verona)

**Michael Yudanin** (Brīvā Universitāte/Free University, Riga, Latvia), *Responsibility to the past, present, and future*

**Alma Diamond** (NYU School of Law), *Membership and owning up to collective harms*

**Karsten Schubert** (Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg), *Epistemic responsibility. Transforming knowledge as democratization*

### **Panel 10: Responsibility and science** | Sala Olimpica

**Moderator:** **Sandra Götsche** (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

**Nikolaos Pavlakos** (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), *Willensfreiheit und normativer Schuldbegriff: Eine interdisziplinäre Untersuchung zwischen Naturwissenschaften, Philosophie und Strafdogmatik*

**Ann-Katrien Oimann** (Royal Military Academy of Belgium/KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy), *Moral responsibility and LAWS: the importance of the control-requirement*

**Federica Merenda** (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, HIDEANDOLA - Project 101049699, Funded by the European Union), *Individual Criminal Responsibility to reconcile ourselves with the reality of international crimes: an outdated paradigm in the era of killer robots? An Arendtian account AI*

## 17.15 break

## 17.30-19.00 | KEYNOTE JUDITH BUTLER | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Claudia Wirsing** (Humboldt University of Berlin/Technical University of Braunschweig)

**Keynote speaker:** **Judith Butler** (University of California, Berkeley), *Toward a Feminist Politics of Judgment*

**9.45-10.45 | SAFI MEETING | Teatro Vittoria**

**SAFI MEETING:** All participants are invited to talk about SAFI's agenda!

**10.45 break**

**11.00-13.00 | PANELS 11 & 12**

**Panel 11: Intersections** | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Sabrina Zucca-Soest** (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

**Anna Menzel** (Goethe Universität Frankfurt), *Alteritätsethische Verantwortung des Rechts als Frage des Hören-Könnens vor dem Antworten-Müssen*

**Corinna Eich** (Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt), *Gilles Deleuze' Ereignis: Ein bildungsstiftender Raum für eine verantwortungsvolle Haltung?*

**Stella Synegianni** (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena), *Nicht Schuld, sondern Verantwortung: über die nachträgliche Aufarbeitung eines ungesühnten Kriegsverbrechens*

**Panel 12: Political and economic responsibility** | Sala Olimpica

**Moderator:** **Claudia Wirsing** (Humboldt University of Berlin/Technical University of Braunschweig)

**Hannah McHugh** (University College London), *Rescuing the role of blame in political responsibility*

**Jasmine Khin** (Northwestern University), *Corporate accountability and political responsibility under the United Nations human rights framework*

**Silvia Donzelli** (Bielefeld University), *Responsibility for complicity: the problem of "neutral" business transactions*

**13.00 lunch break**

**15.00-17.00 | PANEL 13 & 14**

**Panel 13: Responsibility and Law** | Sala Olimpica

**Moderator:** **Kristin Albrecht** (University of Salzburg)

**Miriam Gassner-Olechowski** (University of Vienna), *Responsibility in legal philosophy and international law after WWI*

**Camille Van Peteghem** (PhD Candidate and FWO Fellow at KU Leuven Law Faculty and Visiting Researcher at Yale Law School), *Responsibility in Diversity: questions of cultural communication in the construction of contracts*

**Minni Leskinen** (University of Turku), *Responsibility in doing feminist de lege ferenda research*

**Panel 14: Foundations of responsibility** | Teatro Vittoria

**Moderator:** **Andrea Lanza** (University of Florence)

**Chiara Magni** (University of Roma Tre/Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), *Kant, Hegel e il diritto di costringere: indagine sulla fondazione moderna della "responsabilità" giuridica*

**Ilaria Ferrara** (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici), *The Kantian Approach to vulnerability: an epistemological-moral reflection between illness, responsibility and fragility*

**Giulia Battistoni** (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici/University of Verona), *Grounding Responsibility: Kant's and Hegel's approach in light of the state of necessity*

**17.00 break**

**17.30 - 19.00 | KEYNOTE ERZSÉBET RÓZSA | Teatro Vittoria**

**Moderator:** **Giulia Battistoni** (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici/University of Verona)

**Keynote speaker:** **Erzsébet Rózsa** (University of Debrecen), *Verantwortung in Ágnes Hellers Philosophie*

**19.00**

**Conclusions**

\* \* \*

Congress' coordinator: Giulia Battistoni (Spokeswoman of SAFI in Italy; Post-Doc, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici; Awarded Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellowship).

Co-Organizers: Carlo Chiurco (Associate Professor, University of Verona), Mirko Gragnato (President of IXDeae - APS; European Charlemagne Youth Prize), Davide Poggi (Associate Professor, University of Verona; Director of the Centre "Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica"), SAFI Team: Kristin Albrecht (Post-Doc at the Paris-Lodron Universität Salzburg); Claudia Wirsing (Post-Doc at the Technical University of Braunschweig; visiting scholar at the Humboldt University of Berlin); Sabrina Zucca-Soest (Post-Doc at the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg); Stephan Kirste (Professor at the Paris Lodron Universität Salzburg); Roland Lhotta (Professor at the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg).

With the cooperation of the Association IXDeae and the research Centers of the Department of Human Sciences of the University of Verona "Asklepios" and "Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica":



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## ABSTRACTS

### Panel 1: Responsibility, causation and climate crisis

29<sup>th</sup> September | 11.15-13.15 | Sala del Consiglio

#### **Sarah Hiller (Free University of Berlin/Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), *Responsibility without causation - Probability raising as an independent desert base***

Current crises such as climate change, mass extinction or the Covid pandemic and the related questions regarding collective decision making have exemplified the need for a formal quantification of responsibility in complex interactive situations. Our focus lies on an objective and normative assessment.

In the formal ethical literature, it goes undisputed that actual causation is one of the preconditions of responsibility. That is, both cause and effect must actually obtain and they must stand in the relevant causal relation to each other. How exactly this causal relation is implemented may vary from causal models [5] to NESS causation [2] or the very strict variant of *seeing to it that* [7], but the presupposition of actual causation for responsibility ascription remains intact.

However, there are definitely cases in which we want to assign responsibility while actual causation is absent. For example, in legal contexts *attempts* are well-known cases of non-actualized causal relations. One way this has been integrated into the above-mentioned formal representations is via an explicit addition of action failure to the existing structure [1]. On a more general view, in situations in which we wish to assign moral responsibility without being able to rely on actual causation because an unsuccessful attempt was made to reach a certain outcome, researchers have noted that the action in question increased the chance of the unwanted outcome occurring [4]. This, we believe, has added to an existing confusion regarding the relation between causation and probability raising. Namely, the differences between these two concepts have been overlooked and it was attempted to reduce causation to probability raising [8, 11].

However, we know that there may be causation without probability raising and probability raising without causation [6], so this reduction seems implausible.

We argue, instead, that probability raising may serve as an independent desert base for responsibility ascription, as was suggested previously in a legal context e.g. by Moore [10]. Each desert base can maximally define a lower bound for responsibility quantification; an absence of probability increase does not imply an absence of responsibility, as there may still be a causal connection.

Starting from this premise we selected four paradigmatic example scenarios to guide us in determining the baseline from which an increase in probability is to be computed. It turns

out that neither a comparison with a single best nor a single worst scenario adequately captures all of the discussed paradigmatic scenarios. Instead, we need to incorporate a comparison within a range of possible alternative scenarios.

**Acknowledgements:** This is joint work with Jobst Heitzig. I also wish to specially thank Jan Broersen, who provided a lot of input to put this work into perspective.

#### References

- [1] Alexandru Baltag, Ilaria Canavotto, and Sonja Smets. Causal Agency and Responsibility: A Refinement of STIT Logic. 2020.
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- [10] Michael S. Moore. Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 156(2):395-452, 2007.
- [11] Peter Vallentyne. Brute Luck and Responsibility. *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 7(1):57-80, 2008.

### **Friederike Hartz (University of Cambridge), *Changing responsibilities in a warming world: Climate science and its role in activism***

The climate around us is changing at a relentless pace and the time to act is now. This is the main message of the 6th Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in 2021–2022. As the “issue of climate change focalizes the question of responsibility as no other contemporary issue” (O’Mahony, 2015, p. 309), the IPCC’s AR6 gives rise, once again, to important questions concerning responsibility in the context of climate change. Notions and theories of responsibility, such as Apel’s idea of societal co-responsibility (Apel, 1993) are needed to “make sense of climate change” (O’Mahony, 2015, p. 315), because the issue of climate and its changes is closely linked to

“political questions of agency, ethics and responsibility” (Knox, 2015, p. 91) which go beyond traditional questions of liability, blame and guilt. Climate has become a ‘political material’ in which responsibility arises for those who understand its changes and “think like a climate” (Knox, 2015, p. 105).

At a time in which increasingly frequent extreme weather events sharpen a sense of urgency in the public sphere, (climate) scientists – those who think like a climate – face “new social (and political) roles and responsibilities” (Porter & Dessai, 2017, p. 9). Here, ideas of science in activism are refracted in calls both from members of the public and the academic community to ‘listen to the science’. Taking the case of a group of activist scientists called “Scientist Rebellion” which leaked parts of the IPCC WGIII draft reports prior to intergovernmental approval in August 2021, this paper discusses the growing entanglement of science, activism and responsibility. Adding new layers of complexity to a fundamental discussion about (ir)responsibility in and of (climate) science, I wonder: What constitutes (ir)responsible activism in and of science? In doing so, the paper sheds light on the ways in which scientists across disciplines may come to navigate science-activism-responsibility nexus.

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## **Panel 2: Reflections on moral and legal responsibility**

*29<sup>th</sup> September | 11.15-13.15 | Sala Rossa*

### **Lucia Vantini (University of Verona), *L'intreccio tra etica della cura e antropologia della vulnerabilità: un'altra grammatica della giustizia***

Il tempo della pandemia ha confermato il senso e l'urgenza di quelle prospettive filosofiche che intrecciano l'etica della cura con un'antropologia della vulnerabilità per restituire fisionomia relazionale ad alcuni concetti-chiave del divenire umano, come autonomia, libertà, giustizia, stato di eccezione.

Questa postura filosofica – diversamente declinata in Gilligan, Lévinas, Wolgast, Butler, Cavarero, Kristeva e Kittay – si giustifica sottolineando la complessità delle esperienze in gioco. In primo luogo l'esperienza della cura non si risolve mai nel dono che dei soggetti forti fanno ad altri deboli; inoltre, occorre domandarsi: chi si prende cura delle/dei curanti e in quale trama di rapporti giuridici, economici e sociali? In secondo luogo, anche se si può sperimentare in storie molto diverse, l'esperienza della vulnerabilità è comune a tutti gli esseri umani e risulta essenziale sia per i processi di soggettivazione sia per il destino delle comunità.

L'assunzione di tali questioni si lega alla critica, avanzata soprattutto da parte femminista, del paradigma neoliberista contemporaneo: in quest'ultimo le relazioni sono sì contemplate e persino apprezzate, ma sono intese in modo strumentale e competitivo come risorse volte

all'imprenditoria di sé; non si contempla che anche il soggetto che offre aiuto sia egli stesso vulnerabile.

Dalla lettura femminista scaturisce un'altra grammatica della giustizia, che non punta all'autonomia né alla cancellazione delle differenze, ma che resta in ascolto delle disparità reali e rimane aperta a una logica del dono creatore di legame, capace di nominare gli attaccamenti feriti, di criticare gli squilibri sociali e di sostenere le vite considerate di scarto. Ne esce anche un'altra versione del logos filosofico, sensibile alle narrazioni singolari ma anche attento alla performatività del linguaggio, ispirato da ciò che va nascendo e non solo preoccupato di ciò che muore, disposto a mettere in conto l'imprevisto, in dialogo con i risultati delle neuroscienze riguardo alla potenza morale delle emozioni, critico verso le tante forme di abiezione con cui le società giustificano l'esclusione dei soggetti marginali, e attento a tutte le relazioni di disparità, in primo luogo a quella materna, prima relazione di cura.

Si tratta poi di mettere in discussione molte delle contrapposizioni binarie su cui si è costruito il logos occidentale: soggetto/oggetto, autonomia/libertà, logos/emozione, mente/corpo, giustizia/cura, cultura/natura. Facendo emergere una nuova trama simbolica, non più fondata su tali opposizioni, la responsabilità emerge come tratto originario del pensiero che si fa narrazione, decisione, legge e cura, ma anche come compito infinito che domanda specifiche prese di posizione.

La cura di sé non può essere disgiunta da quella di altri: essa deve diventare maggiormente consapevole della trama incarnata e relazionale in cui ciascun soggetto è radicato; inoltre, la propensione alla cura si deve coltivare nelle nuove generazioni attraverso un'educazione che accompagni e risvegli il desiderio affinché esso non venga sequestrato da logiche narcisiste, autoreferenziali e consumistiche, ma si scopra libero proprio nel suo essere legato alle relazioni, al mondo e al bene comune.

**Vittoria Franco (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa), *Responsabilità come dotazione di soggettività***

Nel mio intervento intendo trattare il concetto di responsabilità sotto il profilo morale e indagare la possibilità di costruire un'etica della responsabilità, che tenga conto dello status di autonomia individuale e della relazione con altri, in una condizione che si può definire di «autonomia relazionale».

Spesso si fa coincidere la responsabilità con la libertà, ma in realtà quest'ultima è un presupposto della responsabilità, nella quale, insieme con la relazione, entra in campo anche il limite. Limite significa che la libertà non può essere assoluta, ma è necessariamente relativa, dal momento che più libertà vengono messe a confronto e devono trovare una misura del con-vivere. Autonomia e relazione parlano di un'ambivalenza costitutiva che sta già dentro il termine responsabilità.

Nato in epoca moderna, il lessema responsabilità si è sviluppato in parallelo con la figura dell'individuo "moderno" che soppianta l'individuo "tradizionale"; diventa dotazione di soggettività, esercizio della facoltà di giudizio. L'individuo "responsabile" è una figura ulteriore, nuovo soggetto agente della modernità, legato alla presa di coscienza dell'essere immersi nelle relazioni.

Se pensiamo alla storia delle donne, diventa chiaro che esse hanno avuto accesso al pianeta libertà quando hanno potuto acquisire soggettività e responsabilità: quando sono state nelle condizioni di rispondere delle loro scelte; quando il loro ruolo e il posto che occupano nella società non è stato più considerato pre-destinato.

Il campo della responsabilità comprende dunque il sé e l'altro. Uno dei due aspetti non può andare senza l'altro, altrimenti si approda a teorie che ricadono o nella sovranità assoluta e nell'individualismo indifferente oppure in una concezione religiosa, oblativa, della responsabilità.

Quando si parla di "etica della responsabilità" non si indica niente di acquisito per quel che riguarda la pratica morale, se non l'idea di una soggettività immersa nelle relazioni, chiamata a governare l'"essere con" dopo la rottura con la tradizione e con la normatività generale e imperativa.

Una questione che si è posta nella discussione filosofica sulla responsabilità riguarda la reciprocità. A me pare non accoglibile una concezione della responsabilità illimitata e unilaterale, come quella che propongono, ad esempio, Levinas (darsi totalmente all'altro) e Jonas (responsabilità rivolta esclusivamente verso esseri ed entità vulnerabili). Questa è certamente una forma di responsabilità, ma non è l'unica. Sostengo che la reciprocità non possa essere esclusa e che proprio la vulnerabilità costitutiva degli esseri umani richieda talvolta il reciproco "riconoscimento di responsabilità". Anche nella costruzione di una diversa relazione fra uomini e donne, non più basata sul possesso e sul dominio, la reciprocità è imprescindibile, come dimostra Luce Irigaray. Riconoscimento di soggettività e reciprocità devono procedere insieme. D'altra parte, la celebre affermazione di Dostoevskij sull'essere tutti responsabili di tutto e di tutti non è alla portata dell'uomo finito. Sarebbe un'impresa gigantesca.

Vorrei sottolineare ancora come il paradigma morale della responsabilità segni una cesura rispetto al paradigma giuridico (che ha una dimensione retrospettiva e coincide con la colpevolezza) e assuma una dimensione prospettica, nel senso di "farsi carico", impegnarsi per una cura. Una forma di responsabilità senza colpa, nella quale prevale la radice sponsare, promettere solennemente.

### **Ana C. Gómez (Purdue University), *Conditions of legal responsibility: the case of Colombia***

In April 2022, the Colombian president appeared before the United Nations Security Council. He presented an optimistic progress report on the implementation of the 2016

peace agreement between the former Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Russia's permanent ambassador to the United Nations said the government was **responsible** for "major failures" in the implementation. Particularly striking for the ambassador was the government's failure to protect the life and personal integrity of members of the extinct guerrilla who left their arms and are in the transition to joining civilian life.

This episode motivates the research for this essay. The goal is to elucidate self-imposed legal conditions on account of which the Colombian government is responsible for the protection of the right to bodily security to former combatants. The most crucial element to determine the domains of legal responsibility is the identification of Colombia, a sovereign contemporary nation state, at the center of agency.

The following are the conditions that generate legal obligations to the government to former FARC members. **First**, the international contractual commitments to the United Nations, other similar agencies, and countries. **Second**, the voluntary signing and ratification of conventions and treaties on international legal human rights, particularly bodily security, that oblige the government towards all peoples. **Third**, the condition of responsibility to FARC, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. Unfortunately, the overall cost of the execution of the once called "Colombian Plan Marshall" has been above what the government could finance on its own. Thus, in virtue of international pacts of cooperation in human rights, international actors have been observers, verify compliance and provide resources for the parties. **Finally**, the enactments in domestic law with respect to Colombian citizens. The government is constitutionally obligated to respect inherent dignity of the human person, which is a ruling principle across the normative system.

The full version of this paper presents the interconnection of the legislative conditions for the protection of the same legal right.

### **Panel 3: Responsibility and vulnerability**

*29<sup>th</sup> September | 15.15-17.15 | Sala del Consiglio*

#### **Hamza Safouane (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *A claim for agency: From guests to hosts in Jordan's refugee camps - Notes from the field***

In this article, we share our reflections about the fieldwork that they conducted in October 2018 in Jordan's Azraq camp for Syrian refugees. The research project was initially designed to conduct qualitative in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees in order to collect testimonies of their personal experiences of Daesh's modes of governance in the territories they conquered between 2013 and 2017. However, the difficult-to-research characteristic of our

topic triggered our interviewees' reluctance to participate in the interviews, which drove us to considerably re-orient our research towards examining living conditions in the camp. We integrated this important development in a deeper reflection on refugees' vulnerability and strategies to mitigate them in the particular spatial layout of the Azraq camp. We share here our experience of accessing the camp and inserting ourselves in a network of power relations that involves the camp as a space for mobility control, the managing staff, and the residents with their social practices, vulnerabilities, and attempts at recovering their spatial agency.

**Birte de Gruisbourne (Institute of Media Studies, University of Paderborn),**  
***Inclination, responsibility and the autonomizing structure of care***

In my talk I will pull together Adriana Cavarero's concept of inclination with what I call the autonomizing structure of care in order to better understand the conditions of responsibility from a mostly philosophical perspective. I define care as an affective, asymmetrically reciprocal, relational and autonomizing practice. With this definition at hand, I hope to capture the different tensions inscribed in caring relationships. Furthermore, this definition will help to scrutinize different (on the first sight maybe not so caring) practices for elements of care and propose criteria for critique.

Described as an inclined relation care comprises an ontological fact and a normative claim, i.e., a responsibility to care for and about those who or which call for it.

As relational beings we are always already differently inclined towards any other. But inclination as an openness to "whatever may affect me from the outside world" (Cavarero 2016: 5f.) can also be normatively described as the virtuous posture of care. An inclined posture makes us responsive for an other's demand for care and by making oneself responsive one takes responsibility for the other's autonomy.

While every relationship we label as 'care' includes affective, reciprocal and relational elements, I want to stress that successful or good care should include autonomizing elements as well. This is what inclination in Cavarero's definition can help to understand: that by holding oneself inclinational one recognizes the other and by reacting to their needs one supports or enacts their autonomy. While the idea of an autonomous and self-determined subject is one of the central philosophical concepts challenged by Cavarero in her book on inclination, I want to adhere to autonomy, but as something that happens in-between, as an autonomizing relation which only holds within the current relation and does not need a stable or erect subject.

This concept of autonomy may challenge typical juridical categories as there is no autonomous subject, but only an autonomizing relation. I want to argue that this concept takes our relational ontology seriously and may help to conceptualize responsibility not from the perspective of the subject, but from their relation. While the outlined concept of autonomy and responsibility has its roots in paradigmatic caring relations like mothering, I

hope to show that this can give some general insights about the relation of responsibility, autonomy, and care also in institutional or juridical contexts.

**Hannah Vögele (Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics, University of Brighton), *My body, my responsibility? Bodily self-ownership, vulnerability and responsibility***

The slogan “My Body My Choice” is no longer reserved for feminist movements for reproductive justice, bodily self-determination and abortion rights. In 2021, we witnessed anti-mask and antivax protestors appropriate the slogan to refuse protective covid-measures and abdicate all collective responsibility vis-a-vis the broader community. At the same time, bodies originally centered in this political assertion are under attack in a roll back of abortion as well as trans rights.

In this paper, I take affirmations of bodily self-ownership, autonomy and self-determination as a starting point to investigate the relationship between individual and collective responsibility. I am cautious about individualistic claims regarding the body that privatize responsibility and vulnerability and tend to disregard systemic issues. At the same time, I want to show how such individual claims never really hold their own. I point to the fragility of claims to ownership over body and life, in fact, their conditionality on other qualifying social, cultural and ideological circumstances.

Therefore, I first present different politicizations of bodies between individualization and collective demands. We can see these different relationships to the body and body politics, and articulations of individual ownership, control and choice, as well as responsibility and vulnerability, at play in feminist protests fighting for the right to abortion vs. right wing protests against mask and vaccination mandates today. I then show how individualist arguments are often combined with other collectivist, or other moral or political, arguments by way of a brief excursion into the history of the abortion struggle. Claims for bodily self-ownership and control re-birth control and abortion emerged grounded in eugenicist principles of population control within the so called first wave of western feminism around the turn of the century. I especially focus on the German context and the radical feminists that utilized arguments of individual control and ownership whilst stressing women's responsibility to the nation, the “quality of the population” and the “new generation”. I finally argue that while the individual language of individual ownership, choice and responsibility has been important for the fight for reproductive autonomy, it cannot be enough.

Rather, both history and present show how in the wrong circumstance or application it could even be harmful. This warrants a stronger focus on the interconnectedness of bodies and structural collective responsibilities for the specific systems in which these bodies and their vulnerabilities exist.

## Panel 4: Responsibility and vulnerability

29<sup>th</sup> September | 17.15-19.15 | Sala del Consiglio

### **Valentina Surace (University of Messina), Judith Butler: la responsabilità al di là dei limiti della sola legge e del volere libero**

Judith Butler osserva che l'esperienza della perdita rivela dolorosamente la vulnerabilità umana e la dipendenza in cui ci tengono le relazioni con gli altri, sfidando l'idea di un io autarchico e costringendoci a ripensare il senso della responsabilità. La vulnerabilità è il segno della condizione *primaria* di esposizione in cui ci troviamo in quanto consegnati nelle mani degli altri; tuttavia, le norme che strutturano la società determinano una distribuzione *differenziale* di vulnerabilità, discriminando tra vite degne di essere vissute e compiute e vite sacrificabili e indegne di lutto.

La vulnerabilità costituisce l'orizzonte della nostra responsabilità, che, per Butler, non può essere pensata nei limiti della *sola legge* e del *volere libero*, così come è stata pensata tradizionalmente, perché il rendere conto di sé è sempre rivolto a un altro, che non è solo il *testimone* delle mie azioni, ma anche il *nome* di ciò che interrompe la mia autarchia.

Mediante la teoria althusseriana dell'interpellazione, Butler pensa l'essere responsabili come il rispondere *di sé* davanti alla *legge*. Se per Althusser la coscienza preesiste all'interpellazione, per Butler, la coscienza, o meglio il soggetto, si costituisce nel momento stesso in cui risponde alla legge. Il fatto che la legge garantisca un'esistenza, facendo leva sul desiderio di essere, pregiudica la possibilità di sottoporla a critica. Butler, perciò, pensa un'*agency* capace di allontanarsi dalla legge, riprendendo la distinzione tra ragione pratica e obbedienza, formulata da Arendt per la situazione della società tedesca durante il regime nazista. Per Arendt la partecipazione della maggioranza fu causata da una compromissione non della responsabilità, ma della capacità di giudizio; i non partecipanti, considerati irresponsabili dalla maggioranza, furono gli unici che giudicarono da sé. Butler condivide l'idea arendtiana che la responsabilità non coincide con l'*obbedienza* acritica alla legge, ma nasce dal *pensiero*, che spinge a opporsi a una legge criminale, però non considera il pensiero un *dialogo solitario* con sé stessi, perché in sé reca la traccia della *socialità* che ci costituisce.

È a questo punto che Butler compie un 'salto teoretico', dall'"eccomi qui", pronunciato da chi risponde di sé davanti alla legge, all'"eccomi *per gli altri*" levinassiano. Butler apprende da Levinas che la responsabilità è *infinita*, incommensurabilmente più vasta della libertà finita, e *anarchica*, perché non ha un principio, tantomeno un principio soggettivo come la libertà. La responsabilità emerge come conseguenza non dell'essere *liberi*, ma dell'essere *soggetti* all'appello dell'altro, chiamati ad una risposta che non possiamo eludere né

demandare. Se l'accusa della legge presuppone un nesso di *causalità* tra agente e atto, l'appello accusativo dell'altro rimanda a una *passività* radicale. Inoltre, se il dovere giuridico chiama a dar conto di sé davanti a *tutti* gli altri, il dovere infinito mi obbliga davanti a *ogni* altro in quanto altro e unico. Questa, che Derrida chiama aporia della responsabilità, non può essere risolta, ma solo negoziata, tramite il pensiero, in ciascuna situazione.

**Timothy J. Huzar (King's College London), *Being present to vulnerability: Uniqueness and responsibility in Butler, Cavarero and Lewis***

In this paper I engage the accounts of vulnerability offered by Judith Butler, Adriana Cavarero and Gail Lewis to contribute to the development of an ethic of responsibility. I argue that accounts of vulnerability need to attend to what Cavarero, following Hannah Arendt, calls a person's uniqueness. I draw on Lewis' dual understanding of "presence" — signifying *being present* to someone as well as the *presencing* of someone — to demonstrate that there is a necessary ethic of responsibility when apprehending the uniqueness of another, one that must negotiate the violent effects of the ongoing legacies of European colonialism.

Butler famously identifies two linked ways that vulnerability can be understood. On the one hand Butler details a 'political' understanding of vulnerability, drawing attention to the way certain peoples are not recognised as grievable and thus are made more vulnerable. On the other hand, Butler details an 'existential' or 'ontological' understanding of vulnerability, which rethinks existence away from masculinist sovereignty and towards relationality. In this latter reading, the ethic of responsibility that emerges for Butler is primarily concerned with resisting one's desire to do harm to the other. With Butler, Adriana Cavarero also rethinks existence as vulnerable. However, the ethic that Cavarero develops is concerned less with working through one's violent tendencies or desires, and is instead concerned with the specificity of another person. For Cavarero, responsibility emerges between people because each person is unique and vulnerable, caught between the two poles of care or wound. Attending to another's uniqueness is a primary ethical and political moment that offers resources to rethink existence, and with it responsibility.

In this context, engaging Lewis' work is particularly valuable as she centres Black women's experiences of racism, and the violent foreclosure of their recognition within the Western episteme. I argue that Lewis' work supports Cavarero's insight that the singularity of another — the specificity of their existence, or their uniqueness — is integral to understandings of vulnerability. However, Lewis also makes clear that the ongoing antiblack legacies of European colonialism complicate the apprehension of another's uniqueness. Lewis reveals forms of presencing practised by Black women when negotiating these legacies, further expanding the ethic of responsibility made apparent when one considers vulnerable uniqueness.

**Alicia Valdés (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), *The act of coalitions. A political praxis from vulnerability and responsibility***

Is there a difference between individual and collective vulnerability? Can we think about vulnerability without appealing to responsibility? Do the notions of social vulnerability and responsibility allow for a new political praxis? Departing from Judith Butler's differentiation between precarity and precariousness and her theorizations of bodily interdependence and ontology, this communication aims to approach both questions from feminist political philosophy.

Following Butler's theory, precarity is unequally distributed between subjects, while precariousness responds to a shared condition between humans. Precariousness is the word that Butler chooses to define the shared condition of interdependency between all bodies, which makes all human beings vulnerable. To speak of precariousness leads Butler to define her theory of ontology as a bodily ontology that "[...] Implies the rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, exposure, bodily persistence, desire, work and the claims of language and social belonging".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, several feminists have claimed that the denial of interdependence springs from the imposition of the Cartesian subject as an individual subject that does not rely on other bodies. Thus, from a feminist standpoint, one can infer and confirm that vulnerability is always collective.

However, how does this definition of vulnerability as a shared and always collective element relate to collective responsibility? It is here where the concept of precarity comes into play. Precarity is always unequally distributed, and this unequal distribution is the direct consequence of a series of operations that occur through systems of oppression and domination, which do not only unequally distribute oppression but also privileges. Thus, this communication argues that the unequal distribution of precarity implies the creation of two ontological-political statuses: existence as inhabiting the systems of oppression with privileges and ek-sistence as inhabiting these systems as oppressed subjects. By introducing privilege as a critical element to thinking intersectionality, one is able to ask themselves whether every subject has the same conditions to fight the unequal distribution of precarity. A privileged subject—able, white, cisgender, etc.—who is politically implicated in the cause of justice must consider the role that their privileges give them in such cause. In other words, this subject must consider their responsibility once vulnerability is understood as a shared condition. How are we to think of a political praxis from the idea of collective responsibility? This communication attempts to answer this question by proposing what I define as the act of coalitions. Through this act, a privileged subject (existing subject) together with precarious subjects (ek-sisting subjects) create the conditions to dislocate the frames that support the systems of oppression that allow for the unequal distribution of precarity.

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<sup>1</sup> Butler, *Frames of War*, 2.

## Panel 5: Intersections

30<sup>th</sup> September | 9.15-11.15 | Teatro Vittoria

### **Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), *Responsibility and oppressive coercion***

Legal and ethical practices take coercion to diminish the voluntariness of one's action and, correspondingly, to cancel or diminish the agent's responsibility for action. This paper argues that in the case of volitional coercion, the implications for moral responsibility and accountability are far more complex than these practices assumed.

Section 1 takes volitional coercion to include varieties of individual and collective, psychological and structural abuse, in contrast to standard definitions that focus on threat (Nozick, Frankfurt, Pallikkathayil). On the standard view, the agent under threat has no choice but to comply with the coercer's request. However, this characterization misunderstands the wrong suffered in volitional coercion because (i) it misappreciates a distinctive feature of volitional coercion, which is that agents feel bound by the responsibility to act to avert the threatened scenario, and (ii) it assumes an instrumentalist approach to reasoning. The coercer exploits the agent's agential powers and her capacity for reasoning, comparing prospects of action, and calculating gains and losses. However, when deliberating about acting under threat, the agent is not only concerned with cutting losses, but also with the way in which her freedom of choice is infringed upon. The latter concern may ground the refusal to comply as a rationally respectable response to coercion, contrary to what the instrumentalist approach suggests.

Section 2 identifies a neglected variety of volitional coercion, which obtains when oppressive cultural/institutional structures limit the agents' sense of their opportunities of action and undermine their sense of efficacy as well as (social and political) agency. The section focuses on cases in which oppressive coercion is operated by emotional abuse or blackmail. The analysis of these cases highlights the further ways in which the agent is wronged as partner in personal relation. It also calls attention to the conditions under which coercion blocks co-reactive attitudes associated with moral responsibility, such as blame and invites others such as anger, resentment, forgiveness, and solidarity.

In a dynamic and relational account, co-reactive attitudes are taken to be emotional modes of mutual recognition, but also structural modes of negotiating the boundaries of the moral community. To this extent, they play an active role in the struggle for social and political recognition.

Section 3 aims to identify the conditions under which agents acting under duress can be held responsible, accountable, and answerable for their submissive action. These conditions refer to the capacity to exercise some agential powers and engage with the coercer. Claiming responsibility in coerced action is a morally sensitive issue. For instance, taking responsibility for having been assaulted might be a self-defeating attitude induced by an

oppressive social structure marked by gender division. But in other cases, reclaiming responsibility for action under threat qualifies as a healthy response to the coercer's attack, by which the agent reaffirms her deliberative and normative powers, showing determination and resilience. Finally, such conditions are taken to ground at least a prima facie duty to resist coercion, and a collective duty to sustain oppressed agents to resist coercive structures and reclaim full agency.

### **Sabrina Zucca-Soest (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *Verantwortung und Konsens***

Verantwortung ist ein starker, ein fordernder Begriff, der Personen dazu auffordert das notwendig Richtige zu tun. Werden wir unserer Verantwortung nicht gerecht, handeln wir falsch. So basal dieser Begriff in unser alltägliches Miteinander eingebunden ist, so vielschichtig und kontrovers werden seine Herleitung wie auch Anwendung diskutiert. So ist in vielen Zeitungen derzeit zu lesen, es sei unsere *Verantwortung* der Ukraine in Zeiten des Krieges beizustehen. Durch Klagen steigt der Druck auf Staaten oder einzelne Akteure deren *Verantwortung* für den Klimawandel gerichtlich festgestellt werden soll. So hat auch das deutsche Bundesverfassungsgericht unlängst in einem bahnbrechenden Urteil (Beschluss vom 24.3.2021) die *Verantwortung* des Staates für noch ungeborene Generationen festgeschrieben.

Was aber bedeutet Verantwortung? Und wer kann überhaupt wie feststellen ob die Einforderung von Verantwortung gerechtfertigt und gut begründet ist?

Der Begriff Verantwortung, entstammt ursprünglich dem Rechtsleben und beschreibt die rechtfertigende Antwort auf eine Klage oder einen Vorwurf vor Gericht.<sup>2</sup> Das dabei wesentliche Verhältnis zwischen einem Subjekt, einem Objekt und einer Instanz der Verantwortung bestimmt auch den systematischen Begriff: damit Verantwortung entstehen kann, muss es ein handelndes Subjekt geben, das Verantwortung übernehmen d.h. Rechenschaft abgeben oder zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden kann. Diese Verantwortung bezieht sich auf eine Handlung oder die Wirkung eines Handelns als sein Objekt, und sie wird übernommen gegenüber oder eingefordert von einer Instanz. Damit eine Person Subjekt der Verantwortung werden kann, muss sie überhaupt zurechnungsfähig und darüber hinaus für die Wirkungen des Handelns, um die es geht, zuständig sein (Zurechnung). Hier kann es viele Abstufungen und Formen der Zurechnungsfähigkeit und der Zuständigkeit geben, die auch je unterschiedliche Verantwortungen definieren.

Besonders kontrovers wird in der Ethik die Frage nach der Instanz behandelt, vor der die Verantwortung für das eigene Handeln besteht und der gegenüber dessen Rechtfertigung gefordert ist. Die Antworten auf diese Frage reichen von Gott über die Menschheit, die von den Wirkungen des zu verantwortenden Handelns Betroffenen oder die an dem Diskurs

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<sup>2</sup> *Mittelstraß*, Jürgen, Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaft, Stuttgart, 2004, -Verantwortung

darüber Beteiligten bis hin zur Natur oder dem Sein als solchem. Die Antwort auf diese Frage hängt dabei von dem umfassenderen Verständnis davon ab, wie das *Begründen und das Rechtfertigen* (Zucca-Soest 2011) des Handelns überhaupt begriffen werden sollen.

Seit wir Gott als Instanz verloren haben, hat sich die Begründungslogik legitimer Ansprüche, also gerechtfertigter Forderung zur Verantwortung, auf die Freiheit und Autonomie der Menschen gerichtet.

Hegel war nun derjenige, der durch die Figur der die *Vielheit umfassenden Einheit*, nach der die Subjekte als *immer schon beieinander* gedacht werden müssen, Menschen in einen intersubjektiven Zusammenhang gestellt hat. Intersubjektivität wird zu einer allgemeinen – dialektisch begriffenen – Grundstruktur, die sich immer schon im Hier und Jetzt abspielen können soll und damit zur Basis für den Versuch die Trennung von Moralität und Legalität zu überwinden.

Dieses Prinzip der intersubjektiven Anerkennung, welches dem Jenaer Hegel entlehnt wird, bindet Habermas in den kommunikationstheoretischen Kontext ein. Hier muss jede gültige Norm der Bedingung genügen, dass die Folgen und Nebenwirkungen, die sich jeweils aus ihrer *allgemeinen* Befolgung für die Befriedigung der Interessen eines jeden Einzelnen (voraussichtlich) ergeben, von allen Betroffenen akzeptiert werden können.<sup>3</sup> Dies gründet in dem Universalisierungsgrundsatz (U), der als Argumentationsregel fungiert, so dass Einverständnis in praktischen Diskursen immer dann ermöglicht wird, wenn Materialien im gleichmäßigen Interesse aller Betroffenen geregelt werden können.<sup>4</sup> Erst mit der Begründung dieses Brückenprinzips kann der Schritt zur Diskursethik gegangen werden.<sup>5</sup> Insofern setzt der diskursethische Grundsatz (D) bereits voraus, dass die Wahl von Normen begründet werden kann.<sup>6</sup> Denn dieser besagt: „Gültig sind genau die Handlungsnormen, denen alle möglicherweise Betroffenen als Teilnehmer an rationalen Diskursen zustimmen können“.<sup>7</sup>

Enggeführt auf die voran aufgeworfenen Fragen zur Verantwortung bedeutet dies nun folgendes: Was aber bedeutet Verantwortung? Und wer kann überhaupt wie feststellen ob die Einforderung von Verantwortung gerechtfertigt und gut begründet ist?

Ich als Person, kann Geltungsansprüche im Diskurs erheben. Nach dem Universalisierungsgrundsatz, muss ich im Diskurs gute Gründe für meinen Anspruch nennen, die von allen Betroffenen akzeptiert werden können müssen. Verantwortung aber ist Konsens.

<sup>3</sup> Habermas, Jürgen, Diskursethik, Studienausgabe, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, S. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Habermas, Jürgen, Diskursethik, Studienausgabe, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, S. 60.

<sup>5</sup> Habermas, Jürgen, Diskursethik, Studienausgabe, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, S. 60.

<sup>6</sup> Habermas, Jürgen, Diskursethik, Studienausgabe, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, S. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Habermas, Jürgen, Faktizität und Geltung, 4. Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, 1994, S. 138.

**Atoosa Kasirzadeh (University of Edinburgh), *Algorithmic fairness and structural injustice: insights from feminist political philosophy***

Data-driven predictive algorithms are widely used to automate and guide high-stake decision making such as bail recommendation and medical resource allocation. Nevertheless, harmful outcomes biased against vulnerable groups have been reported. The growing research field known as Algorithmic Fairness aims to mitigate the harmful biases. The methodology consists in proposing mathematical metrics to address the social harms resulting from an algorithm's biased outputs. The metrics are typically motivated by - as well as substantively rooted in - concrete ideals of distributive justice, as formulated by political theorists and philosophers. The perspectives of feminist political philosophers on social justice, by contrast, has been largely neglected. Feminist political philosophers have criticized the paradigm of distributive justice and have proposed corrective amendments to surmount its limitations. The present paper brings key insights of feminist political philosophy to Algorithmic Justice. The paper has three goals. First, I show that the current scope of Algorithmic Fairness cannot accommodate the concerns of social justice as identified by feminist political philosophy. Second, I defend the relevance of *structural injustices* - as pioneered in the contemporary philosophical literature by Iris Marion Young - to Algorithmic Fairness. Third, drawing upon Young's notion of social justice, I take some steps in developing the paradigm of Responsible Algorithmic Fairness to correct for errors in the current implementation of the Algorithmic Fairness paradigm.

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**Panel 6: Responsibility and vulnerability**

30<sup>th</sup> September | 9.15-11.15 | Sala Olimpica

**Luke Edmeads (University of Brighton), *Vulnerability and suffering: Mimetic relations of responsibility in Butler and Adorno***

In this paper I explore embodied experiences of vulnerability and suffering as resources of conceiving of moral responsibility. Specifically, I compare Judith Butler's account of responsibility predicated on the vulnerable relation to the other and Theodor Adorno's proposition that the suffering of others produces a responsibility to change social conditions. In this comparison I highlight that both conceptions of responsibility are concerned with addressing the suffering of others. For Adorno the somatic, physical response to the abjection and pain of the other induces a responsibility understood as solidarity against suffering. I contend that this bears similarities to Butler's claim that the demand placed on me by the experience of the vulnerability to and from others is a condition for responsibility.

In comparing the two accounts I note that while for Butler responsibility produced through a primary vulnerability to one another is something that we cannot disavow precisely because it is productive of the self, for Adorno responsibility is mimetically produced as a feeling of solidarity with others suffering. Yet despite this distinction I highlight that within the work of both theorists' responsibility emerges from an embodied experience. For Butler responsibility arises as a need to reconsider how the being of the body is vulnerable and "given over" to the other, while for Adorno our somatic, bodily responses to suffering from our moral judgements. As such I contend that the vulnerable and suffering body allows us to rethink the structure of responsibility away from an index of accounting for our own actions and towards a different conception of responsibility orientated towards the other.

**Michaela Bstieler (University of Innsbruck), *Radikale Alterität und Verantwortung. Eine ethisch-politische Relektüre mit Levinas und Butler***

Prekäre Lebensverhältnisse stellen nicht erst seit der Covid-19-Pandemie eine dringende politische Herausforderung dar. Exorbitante Mietpreissteigerungen, zunehmende Wohnungslosigkeit und ungesicherte Wohnverhältnisse aber auch Phänomene wie Gentrifizierung und Privatisierung des öffentlichen Raums sind nur wenige Beispiele für eine globale Entwicklung, die seit geraumer Zeit unter dem Schlagwort der „Wohnraumkrise“ verhandelt wird. Dabei haben Prekarisierungsprozesse und die daraus entstehenden Gefährdungs- und Unsicherheitslagen weitreichende soziale Folgen, insofern sie immer auch die Sichtbarkeit, Handlungsfähigkeit und Anerkennbarkeit von Subjekten unterschlagen. Angesichts des schmerzlichen Wissens, aus dem Horizont des Sozialen grundlegend ausgeschlossen werden zu können und nicht mehr betrauerbar zu sein, stellt sich die Frage, wie wir in einer Zeit, in der bereits die Mittelschicht der westlich-liberalen Demokratien auf nichts mehr bauen kann, über das Verhältnis von (radikaler) Alterität und Verantwortung nachdenken können. Ich werde dieser Frage entlang der alteritätsethischen Ansätze von Emmanuel Levinas und Judith Butler rekonstruieren und dafür argumentieren, dass es im Kampf um eine für alle bewohnbare Welt darauf ankommen könnte, (radikale) Alterität auch an den Rändern des Repräsentierbaren vernehmen und Ansprüche dort hören zu lernen, wo sie am leisesten artikuliert werden: im stillen Protest.

**Sandra Götsche (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg), *Taking responsibility. Reducing refugees' structural vulnerabilities accessing social services***

Forced migration is often viewed as a linear movement out of danger into safety. This is empirically inaccurate because migration is in itself an extremely vulnerable process. Thus,

there are certain contexts and circumstances that increase a person's exposure to vulnerable factors, for instance going through a migratory journey. It follows that, within this understanding of vulnerability, not all human beings are equally exposed to vulnerability. Vulnerability also depends on the specific social, political, economic, historical, cultural, and geographical factors – context matters. It be argued that some groups, such as migrants, can be considered as 'more vulnerable' than others, due to the context in which they find themselves. If one takes a closer look at subgroups, one tends to even differentiate the most vulnerable among the vulnerable. For instance: A refugee seems to be 'more vulnerable' than an economic migrant, a female refugee 'more vulnerable' than a male refugee, and a refugee child 'more vulnerable' than a refugee woman. This superficial hierarchization is critical, since vulnerability does not necessarily occur and is not only dependent on the social context but also on the resilience, fortunate circumstances, adaptability, or coping capabilities of an individual.

A generalized attribution of people and groups as 'vulnerable', here understood in a negative sense – as passive victims, carries the danger of a one-sided stigmatization of migrants as 'problematic' rather than also taking their resources into account. It simplifies it for us to consider European refugees from Ukraine as more vulnerable than those from Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria. However, hierarchization takes place constantly when dealing with migrants: For instance, during the asylum application processing, when deciding who needs certain assistance and who does not, even in a life-and-death situation, when a rescuer needs to decide which person should be rescued first (triage) or when the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) which allowed those fleeing Ukraine access rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and even access to the labour market and education. TPD is a significant step towards a more humane protection system and a fairer sharing of responsibilities between Member States, a fairer sharing that seemed impossible just a few years ago. It also reduces structural vulnerability of Ukrainian refugees through the rights they are granted while Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey and Spanish police forcefully repel those who jump the fence in Melilla. The purpose of this article is to initiate a political, ethical, and legal discussion about the current state of refugees' structural vulnerabilities (using the example of labour market access) und Europe's overall responsibility. Ultimately, this article aims to contribute to a radical change in the grammar of migration hierarchization.

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## Panel 7: Reflections on moral responsibility

30<sup>th</sup> September | 11.30-13.30 | Teatro Vittoria

### **Maja Berseneva (Freie Universität Berlin), *The responsible relationship of self and other in Levinas***

Emmanuel Levinas calls responsibility an 'extreme attention' for the other. Attention as reaction results into response - a word that is sharing its root with the word responsibility. Levinas stresses remarkably, that it is not the other who is paying attention to me, but only I to her. We are facing an asymmetrical affair. In order to approach this exceptional account of responsibility correctly, the author introduces the notion of the face as the place where the response, the first step of responsibility, is staged. The face of the other expresses her whole living being, but it does not speak yet. Prior to uttering words, its silence calls for a reaction. The response to the other does not require self-consideration or even self-reflection. Consequently, my self-importance as well as the priority of my needs is compromised as soon as the other approaches me.

Responsibility is not a principle that is established for all times and places. If we follow Levinas it is correct to say that the subject becomes responsible every time anew, with every new stranger on her way, in this particular moment and place. Responsibility is characterized precisely by a spontaneous outburst that is a response to a particularity. It is not pre-existent, but happens in a 'breathlessness of an inspiration' of someone who cannot catch up with herself. Analogously, the moments of finding oneself responsible, responding, are unique moments, because every time another other is the receiver. The subject does not constantly hear the voice of the ethical consciousness as we would say in the Kantian sense. Rather, the voice comes and passes; it is fragile and does not hold onto a point of reference in form of a statute. Chalier rightly remarks that neither good will, nor maxims are necessary in order to satisfy the hunger of the starving. A human being responsible for the other is not someone who follows a moral command or any principle at all.

In his entire philosophical project, Levinas is asking the basic ethical question of how to be with others, without undoing the otherness that is theirs. How can I leave the other as she is, not 'explaining her away', but still relate to her? His imperative reads as following: do not shut yourself up from the request of the other otherwise you will cease to be a self, in the ethical sense. In his ethics, he postulates the warning that if you fail to respond to the other as other, you obliterate the fellow human being and yourself along with her. This is how, in Levinas' mind, responsibility constitutes and determines the self in its subjectivity. We arrive at the conclusion that being responsible means being a subject, being a self.

## **Edoardo Poli (University of Pisa), *Un invito alla vulnerabilità: per un'etica del perdono***

In un articolo del 2013, intitolato *Recritude: Reflections on Postural Ontology*, Adriana Cavarero scrisse che fino all'operazione compiuta da Emmanuel Levinas la vulnerabilità è stata assente dal dibattito filosofico. In particolare, il filosofo franco-lituano ha basato parte del suo pensiero, da Altrimenti che essere in poi, proprio sull'idea di un essente vulnerabile, esposto al dolore, alla sofferenza e alla morte. La vulnerabilità, dunque, non è un accidente della natura umana, anzi, ne segna l'essenza, è costitutiva. L'accento sulla vulnerabilità è dato dal sempre maggiore peso che Levinas ha dato al corpo, necessario per porre sotto scacco il concetto di intenzionalità che la fenomenologia husserliana proponeva: di contro alla rappresentazione, era necessario ripartire dalla sensibilità e dall'istante in cui senziente e sentito entrano in relazione e si fondono, diventando indistinguibili. Il corpo, già centrale nei primi lavori e in *Totalità e infinito*, finisce per assumere un ruolo da protagonista, proprio a causa della sua possibilità di esporsi, di essere toccato e di aprirsi al contatto con l'altro. Ma la vulnerabilità esposta da Levinas, tuttavia, non è solo quella fisica ma anche quella morale e si lega in modo indissolubile al concetto di responsabilità. Di fatto, il focus dell'etica levinasiana si fonda proprio sull'idea di una responsabilità che porta il soggetto a rispondere per-l'altro, seguendo l'idea dostoevskijana per cui ognuno è colpevole delle colpe degli altri. La novità levinasiana è insita proprio nell'originalità dell'"Eccomi" che il soggetto pronuncia una volta chiamato da Altri a essere responsabile per la sua vulnerabilità: l'altro è, infatti, sempre il povero, la vedova e l'orfano. Tuttavia, ciò che vorrei portare alla luce con questo contributo è il filo rosso che collega la responsabilità e la vulnerabilità nell'opera levinasiana: il perdono. Sebbene non sia uno degli argomenti di maggiore risonanza nelle opere scritte e nella conseguente letteratura secondaria, il perdono occupa a mio avviso un ruolo primario perché si lega a quello della temporalità e all'idea che il soggetto non possa fuggire da sé a meno che non intervenga altri a sciogliere il peso che grava irrimediabilmente sull'esistente.

Vorrei, perciò, innanzitutto ripercorrere l'iter che l'idea di perdono ha subito all'interno del pensiero di Levinas, mostrandone la centralità. Dopodiché, mostrare come dal perdono inteso nel corretto senso di "opera stessa del tempo" si possa giungere a una etica del perdono, facendo emergere, anche grazie al confronto con Derrida, l'impatto che questa avrebbe sulla responsabilità. Soltanto attraverso l'assunzione della nostra fallibilità, dunque della nostra vulnerabilità, possiamo giungere a un'etica del perdono: fare i conti con sé stessi, con il passato per rinnovare il futuro e ristabilire delle relazioni corrette con gli altri al fine di cooperare. Non mancheranno delle critiche a un'etica del genere: cercherò di prendere in considerazione alcune obiezioni da pensatori quali Arendt, Jankélévitch e Améry che hanno visto nella Shoah l'evento cruciale per evidenziare l'esistenza dell'imperdonabile. In più, ricorrerò anche alle riflessioni di Martha Nussbaum per capire quale siano i limiti di un certo tipo di perdono

**Alix Stéphan (University College Dublin), *The conditions of responsibility: Derrida and Kierkegaard in front of the call of the Other***

Establishing a dialogue between Kierkegaard and Derrida is not uncommon (Derrida's *Donner la mort* is largely based on his reading of *Fear and Trembling*), but the notion of responsibility might not be the most common entry point within this discussion. If the notion of responsibility is omnipresent in Derrida's work (following the lead of Levinas), it is less obvious in Kierkegaard's texts and yet, not less important. Indeed, both through the relation to another human and through the relation to God the question of responsibility is asked again and again by Kierkegaard. A responsibility to truth as well as to the other as radically other. It is here that we become aware of the echo between Kierkegaard and Derrida. Then, they both rethink the relation to the other not under the angle of the perception or even jurisdiction, but responsibility and thus justice (which allows Derrida to investigate the notion of hospitality for instance). If of course many differences also arise between these authors, I will focus on the similarities to allow us to better understand the conditions necessary for the development of responsibility. My question is then this one: what are the conditions for responsibility, as jointly drawn by Derrida and Kierkegaard, when meeting the other?

I will conduct my investigation around three elements. Firstly, responsibility must be thought of under the condition of a dissymmetry that both recenter the reflection around the subject and supposes an extraordinary openness to the other. Following this, it is the conception of suspension, or even interruption and fracture that will have to be investigated: interruption of the law as well as of language. The final point that will need to be made to map out these conditions of responsibility is the concept of infinity (the infinite other as well as the infinite meeting).

**Panel 8: Responsibility in psychology and psychoanalysis**

*30<sup>th</sup> September | 11.30-13.30 | Sala Olimpica*

**Elena D'Amore (University of Pisa), *Gioco e responsabilità***

La responsabilità ha a che fare con la capacità soggettiva di rispondere. Omettere la propria risposta all'atto altrui è un atto mancato e ha valore morale poiché spesso incide sull'esito. Ce lo insegnano Arendt nella *Banalità del male* e Rousseau nel *Discorso sull'origine e i fondamenti della disuguaglianza fra gli uomini*. Il secondo propone la scena originaria dell'uomo che delimita un terreno affermando: "questo è mio". Se ricordiamo l'atto del singolo, non dobbiamo dimenticare che la scena è fatta anche da altri soggetti: egli agisce in presenza di altri. Tentare di comprendere la responsabilità sul piano morale e rafforzare

le motivazioni ad agire per il bene sono obiettivi di un discorso etico-politico. Tuttavia, a chi contempi la responsabilità nei termini di volontà e, dunque, di colpa, rischia di mancare la ricerca orientata dalla seguente domanda: come sorge, nella coscienza umana, la capacità di reagire all'atto di un altro? Per un discorso che non escluda ma preceda la questione morale del volere e della colpa, propongo alcuni aspetti della teoria di Donald Winnicott. Psicanalista e medico inglese, egli usò uno spazio ibrido fra oggettività e soggettività, realtà esterna e fantasia, come modello per le esperienze umane di autonomia, riconoscenza e condivisione della responsabilità. Secondo Winnicott, la capacità di una persona di essere, e sentirsi, autrice di ciò che le accade matura in una particolare forma di esperienza. Lo spazio terzo, dove i bambini giocano, viene teorizzato come medio esperienziale per lo sviluppo dei sensi di sé e della realtà, indispensabili alla salute della personalità umana. Se la responsabilità esige di saper rispondere delle proprie azioni, serve innanzitutto saper riconoscere dette azioni come le proprie. Conquistare un equilibrio dinamico fra senso interno ed esterno – col risultato che la coscienza non vede le due dimensioni come scisse, eppure è in grado di distinguerle – è un passaggio fondamentale per acquisire la capacità di discernimento di cui sopra. Esperienze che abbiano lo stesso potere del gioco aiutano la persona adulta a recuperare capacità che ella sente di avere perduto. Nel gioco, inoltre, maturano anticorpi decisivi contro conformismo e rabbia; in almeno due sensi. Il bambino ancora inerme, giocando, supera la paura di restare solo. Chi gioca, inoltre, non teme l'alterità ma la esplora e la scopre come qualcosa che viene anche dal proprio fare. Il mondo esterno diventa realtà significativa attraversando la soggettività, similmente alla cosa lavorata in Hegel. Infine, viene la considerazione del piacere. Chi impara a relazionarsi al mondo creativamente, nella dimensione intermedia fra fantasia e dato di realtà, affronta il compito di adattamento derivandone più piacere che frustrazione. Questo si ripercuote sullo sguardo della persona adulta. Chiamando in causa la psicoanalisi di Winnicott, sostengo che entrare nel mondo condiviso sentendolo come una imposizione indebolisce la capacità di sentirsi responsabile per ciò che al mondo accade. Laddove il processo sia meno frustrante e il singolo si senta parte attiva, in ciò che la realtà può diventare, agire acquista senso e una motivazione interna che resta, a prescindere dalle istanze esterne.

**Caterina Marino (University of Calabria), *La responsabilità impossibile dopo e oltre Freud***

Il concetto di responsabilità, nella sua connotazione etica, oltre che in quella giuridica, da cui ha avuto origine, è legato a quello di Soggetto, a partire dalla sua accezione kantiana: ipostatizzato come unità originaria, il Soggetto sarebbe responsabile delle proprie azioni in quanto dotato di libero arbitrio, autodeterminato e autonomo, dando la legge a se stesso, in grado di padroneggiare, mediante la ragione, i propri impulsi. Tuttavia, la scoperta freudiana dell'inconscio ha depresso il soggetto sovrano e destituito l'ideale di "padronanza", provocando un decentramento dell'lo che "non è nemmeno padrone in casa

propria". Sorge allora inevitabile la domanda: che ne è della responsabilità di un soggetto non più padrone di sé? Se la filosofia moderna ha posto in primo piano il Soggetto del cogito cartesiano, la psicoanalisi ha scoperto il Soggetto dell'inconscio, operando la sostituzione del sapere inconscio rispetto alla certezza della ragione cosciente. Il Soggetto che interessa la psicoanalisi freudiana, e successivamente lacaniana, è situato nella divisione fra ciò che aveva intenzione di dire e l'inciampo della sua parola, il lapsus, come sostiene Freud; fra il soggetto dell'enunciato e il soggetto dell'enunciazione, nell'après-coup delle sue manifestazioni, come afferma Lacan: il Soggetto dell'inconscio non è lì dove ci si aspettava che fosse, ma è sempre altrove, lì dove nemmeno colui che parla sapeva di trovarsi. Dunque, non è il soggetto che parla, ma qualcosa parla in lui e di lui.

La questione su cui riflettere è dunque la seguente: come può, se può, il Soggetto dell'inconscio essere malgrado tutto un soggetto responsabile, dato che l'ideale perseguito in analisi non è la completa padronanza di sé? Né Freud né Lacan si sono mai espressamente occupati di responsabilità, sebbene soprattutto il discorso lacaniano sull'etica della psicoanalisi sia pervaso dalla questione del Soggetto, preso tra l'essere un "effetto" dell'inconscio e, al contempo, il responsabile di questo effetto. Si deve a Jacques Derrida l'aver tematizzato il paradosso di una responsabilità che non prescinde dall'inconscio. Una decisione responsabile, per Derrida, costituisce l'esperienza aporetica dell'indecidibilità o dell'impossibile, che si offre al di là di ogni mera applicazione di un sapere procedurale preconstituito. Essa avanza nel buio del non sapere, attestando la presenza dell'altro assoluto in me, che decide per me e di me. Insomma, per quanto possa sembrare paradossale, una decisione è sempre inconscia. Per questo Derrida sostiene che la responsabilità, se ce n'è, non può che ospitare sempre una irriducibile irresponsabilità. Prima di ogni legge determinata, prima dell'assunzione della responsabilità come di un parlare a proprio nome, siamo già presi e sorpresi, obbligati, in una lacerante responsabilità che proviene dall'altro. L'esistenza di un ospite tanto perturbante come l'inconscio non solo "decide" il Soggetto decentrandolo, ma impone anche di pensare una decisione in qualche modo "passiva", un essere-decisi dalla decisione, che tuttavia non esonera dalla responsabilità di sé come dell'altro e anzi, mostrandola "impossibile", la prescrive come un compito necessario e interminabile. Che la responsabilità sia impossibile è la sola condizione della sua stessa possibilità.

**Giulia Castagliuolo/Paolo Olgiati (University of Bologna/University of Torino), *La responsabilità come presupposto dell'alleanza terapeutica: gli effetti della medicina difensiva in psichiatria***

Nel mondo della Sanità contemporanea il tema della responsabilità ha rivoluzionato la pratica clinica e il rapporto con i pazienti, favorendo la diffusione di una medicina qualitativamente più omogenea e basata sulle evidenze scientifiche, ma anche ingabbiata in protocolli troppo rigidi, spersonalizzata e stravolta dalla necessità di tutelare i sanitari da

spiacevoli conseguenze legali per eventi rubricabili come possibili casi di “malasanità” (medicina difensiva). Nell’esperienza psichiatrica, tutto questo è ulteriormente amplificato dal fatto che lo psichiatra è responsabile di fronte alla società di un individuo che, in quanto suo paziente, è (almeno temporaneamente) vulnerabile e, potenzialmente, pericoloso per sé stesso e per gli altri. Si assiste così a un insidioso scivolamento verso una condizione nella quale la terza componente del Setting è la magistratura. Da ciò deriva un assetto di lavoro che, nella misura in cui si configura come “difensivo”, risulterebbe fortemente anti-terapeutico, oltre che nocivo dell’equilibrio psichico dell’operatore.

Pertanto, si cercherà in primo luogo di considerare alcuni effetti della medicina difensiva in ambito psichiatrico, per poi provare a risalire al ruolo dell’equilibrio tra responsabilità legale e responsabilità insita nel rapporto di cura per la costruzione di una concreta alleanza terapeutica in ambito psichiatrico.

### **Panel 9: Foundations of responsibility**

*30th September | 15.15-17.15 | Teatro Vittoria*

**Michael Yudanin (Brīvā Universitāte/Free University, Riga, Latvia),**  
***Responsibility to the past, present, and future***

In our world, a variety of injustices and outright atrocities take place while we see them in real time, with plenty of means at the disposal of our collective disposal to put a stop to them, and yet they proceed nevertheless: while most of us pity the victims, we somehow do not ourselves responsible enough to put a stop to them. Thus, clarifying the meaning and scope of responsibility acquires extra urgency.

Historically, the discussion of individuals’ responsibility came to the fore with Karl Jaspers’s *Die Schuldfrage* that suggested a framework for categorizing and understanding guilt. Since then, the debate about responsibility has been mostly understood within the categories of guilt and thus constrained by them. I will argue that this framework unduly constraints and even misrepresents responsibility. Guilt is always focused on the role of the individual or the collective to which the individual belongs in the events that already took place. Responsibility, on the other hand, is future-oriented and might not result from an action that can be imputed to the individual or their collective during individual’s lifetime.

Developing Jaspers’s conception of the metaphysical guilt, a category that has been puzzling researchers and is sometimes deemed too mystical to analyze, I will suggest that our responsibility is determined by the potential to act we have or can develop given our current position, not past actions to which we were a part. The responsibility to confront evil and to help those in need applies to all those who can act, not only to those who can be somehow guilty; the guilt will come in the future if we fail to act. Guilt is an outcome of the

responsibility not acted upon rather than its cause. Besides the responsibility to confront injustice, I will also suggest two other categories of responsibility: corrective and preventive. Corrective responsibility applies to fixing the consequences of past injustices to effect better future, e.g., providing reparations for those who suffered discrimination that curtailed their chances to advance. Preventive responsibility is based on recognizing potential outcomes of our action or. Preventing climate catastrophes and dealing with aggressive regimes are examples of this kind of responsibility.

As responsibility is based upon the ability to effect change, different degree of responsibility will be imputed to different agents: what can be done by a military commander in charge of an invading army is different from what can be done by a car mechanic; what can be done. However, the responsibility to act is also related to the responsibility to know, to learn about the situation at hand and to formulate a plan of action. The responsibility to know becomes as important a civic duty as the lack of knowledge has been a convenient excuse for inaction since times immemorial. On the other hand, I will also address fake responsibilities, e.g., the responsibility to the dead, part and parcel of the Western culture since Ancient Greece and a strong propaganda tool today.

Finally, I will try and address philosopher's responsibility. As people who dedicate their lives to truth, discussing its meaning and possibility, providing frameworks for critically assessing knowledge and reality, it is the duty of philosophers to clarify our responsibilities to correct the consequences of past injustices, confront current atrocities, and prevent future catastrophes. Shirking from this responsibility and pretending that our research has nothing to do with what's going on in the world will be betraying the Socratic heritage of philosophy.

### **Alma Diamond (NYU School of Law), *Membership and owning up to collective harms***

The idea that individuals are required to take responsibility for harms caused by supra-individual social structures has been associated with a distinctively modern and perhaps hard-headed individualism. Often, this is taken as grounds to reject the idea of individual responsibility for collective harms and wrongs in the absence of clear causal links between individual actions and harms caused. In this paper, I explore one way in which this line of thought is itself a manifestation of a particular kind of hard-headed individualism. It relies on the assumption that individual responsibility must be attributed solely on the basis of individual intent and not on the basis of an individual's relations with others, or the relational character of an individual's actions. I challenge that assumption by constructing an account of our rights and duties, reasons and justifications, as these take shape relationally. I suggest that our actions have relational characteristics: they serve as reasons and justifications for others, and in this they shape the character of the collectivities we are embedded within. I then explore three kinds of individual responsibilities for collective harms which can be derived from my account. The first is a critical responsibility to scrutinize the social contexts

we are embedded within. The second is an ameliorative responsibility to change and improve those contexts. Both of these are ex ante responsibilities, perhaps better captured as duties. The third is an ex post responsibility for harms caused or wrongs committed. This relates to intra-member imputation of responsibility. How ought members to regard individual perpetrators within their collectivity? Here, I argue that we are mistaken to think we can wash our hands of perpetrators who acted in our name, and for our benefit. Drawing on the concept of moral injury, I argue that all community members are responsible for individual perpetrators, for acknowledging the collective reasons for their crime, and for owning up to shared membership with them.

**Karsten Schubert (Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg), *Epistemic responsibility. Transforming knowledge as democratization***

Responsibility presupposes knowledge. Without knowledge, concepts, and normative theories about the world, there can be no responsibility. It is only our conception of situations, institutions, and laws, as problematic that leads us to take or demand responsibility. However, such knowledge cannot be taken for granted. It is often dependent on social positions and absent especially in cases where taking responsibility is demanded from an emancipatory perspective. What is more, the absence of knowledge – ignorance – is a powerful means to reject responsibility. In recent years, scholarship of newer standpoint epistemologies has shown how “epistemic injustice” (Fricker) and “White ignorance” (Mills) – as well as ignorances of straight, cis, male, and abled people – actively protect structures of domination by preventing knowledge about these discriminating structures. While these works analyze how ignorance leads to social structures that shield privileged actors from taking responsibility, they demand an ethics of responsibility to change this very ignorance. “Epistemic responsibility” (Medina) is an “individual responsibility for what we know and don’t know as well as collective responsibility for the social production of knowledge and ignorance.” This epistemic responsibility, individually understood, navigates a theoretically complicated terrain between structuralist subjectification and analytic-individualist action theory: While it is difficult to hold individuals accountable for specific ignorances that they “have inherited [...] without their choosing”, “we may still hold her or him partially responsible for not taking any steps to displace the ignorance in question” (Medina 2016: 190, 188). This contradiction between a structuralist perspective that is at odds with the concept of individual responsibility (because ignorance prevents responsibility, not only politically, but also analytically) and the demand for individual responsibility (as, nevertheless, we can work towards better knowledge), is not resolved in the contemporary standpoint theories. In my paper, I propose a solution to this problem by drawing on radical democratic theory, arguing that democratic institutions need to actively promote minoritarian knowledges to expose citizens to epistemic friction that challenges their knowledges and ignorances. A crucial element of democratization is therefore individual and

institutional epistemic responsibility for changing hegemonic knowledges. Such changes of knowledge will lead to transformation in the taking and demanding of responsibility.

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## **Panel 10: Responsibility and science**

*30th September | 15.15-17.15 | Sala Olimpica*

**Nikolaos Pavlakos (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München),**  
***Willensfreiheit und normativer Schuldbegriff: Eine interdisziplinäre***  
***Untersuchung zwischen Naturwissenschaften, Philosophie und Strafdogmatik***

The topic I propose for your conference concerns free will as an intrinsic component of guilt and the advocacy of a normative concept of free will due to the unsuitability of a phenomenological definition. Herewith I will try to give you the most essential points of the subject.

Responsibility as a legal concept is based on the concept of guilt. For its part, the concept of guilt necessarily presupposes that humans, as rational beings, are capable of acting freely. The hypothesis of free will underlies the entire structure of responsibility in the legal system. As indispensable as the existence of free will is for jurisprudence, however, the non-legal concept of free will is problematic.

The existence of free will as a dispute between determinism and indeterminism belongs to the greatest philosophical problems, but philosophy - although it remains relevant for the thematization of the problem - has forfeited its place as the most relevant discipline for the topic of free will. Today, it is primarily the natural sciences that prove to be responsible for freedom of will, mainly physics and neuroscience.

Classical mechanics and relativistic physics postulated in the 19th and 20th century that all events in the world unfold purely deterministically; a freedom of will in the sense of the independence of the human will from external factors is completely foreign to this picture of reality. Since the triumphant advance of quantum mechanics after the 1930s, it has nevertheless been established that the world does not function purely deterministically after all, at least at the level of elementary particles. Whether this realization has opened the door to free will is nevertheless controversial. Most scientists still tend to reject free will, because our world in principle - despite the curious observations of quantum mechanics - is still to be described as deterministic. At the same time there are physical theories (like Bell's inequality) which explicitly or implicitly presuppose some kind of free will. Apart from this, however, physics today does not deal with the discussion of free will, which is regarded as philosophical.

The study of free will has therefore been left to the neurosciences. Back in the 1970s, a now infamous and quite controversial experiment was conducted by Benjamin Libet to prove

how the brain instructs us to move prior to any conscious decision to move. The Libet experiment is now considered a failure, yet neuroscientists continue to attempt similar experiments to determine the presence of free will.

It can be guessed that no definite answer to the question of free will can be granted from the natural sciences; at best, free will, which is self-evident for empiricism, can prove to be a paradox. The problem of free will turns out to be a problem of metaphysics instead. The only way to continue to use free will in connection with guilt in jurisprudence is therefore to give it a normative character: Human beings are legally free beings because they must be so in order for society to function harmoniously on the basis of the assumption and allocation of responsibility. The legally recognized freedom of will is thus a functional concept.

**Ann-Katrien Oimann (Royal Military Academy of Belgium/KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy), *Moral responsibility and LAWS: the importance of the control-requirement***

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is currently used in numerous applications and in various fields, including the military domain. The increase in the degree of autonomy in some decision-making systems leads to discussions on the possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A central issue in these discussions is the problem of assigning moral responsibility for some AI-caused outcomes. Several authors claim that the high autonomous capability of such systems leads to a so-called "responsibility gap" where no one can be held morally responsible anymore. The reason for this, on the one hand, is that it would be unfair to hold humans responsible as they no longer control the system, and on the other hand, that it is impossible to hold the system itself responsible as it has no consciousness and cannot be the addressee of punishment. In both philosophical and legal literature, various positions have been taken regarding the responsibility gap and very different solutions have been devised to close the gap. One solution that is increasing in popularity and is being discussed by both philosophers and legal scholars is the doctrine of command responsibility. Although the doctrine of command responsibility was developed to govern the relationship between humans on the battlefield, I argue that legal concepts are sometimes adapted to address new contemporary problems and that it is worth considering whether it is possible to apply the notion analogously to LAWS.

Command responsibility is a form of responsibility attribution whereby superiors can be held indirectly responsible for crimes committed by subordinates. The condition that is generally regarded as the basis for the application of command responsibility, and which I believe will be the deciding factor in assessing whether an application with respect to LAWS is possible, is the requirement that there must exist a relationship between the superior and the subordinates. This can be intuitively easily understood: it seems unfair to hold someone criminally responsible for matters over which one has no control at all. The aim of this talk is to contribute to the ongoing debate on attributing responsibility for serious violations of IHL made by LAWS by reviewing whether the doctrine of command responsibility could offer a

solution. This will be done by first explaining why the solution seems promising in the search for a genuine solution to address moral responsibility gaps in LAWS, including a discussion of the doctrine of command responsibility in general terms. Next, I will focus on the control-requirement that has to be met to apply the doctrine. Here it will be examined how we should interpret the notion of effective control based on key case law. The crucial question in this regard will be the way in which the concept of control has been conceived within jurisprudence and whether it is possible to apply such control to LAWS. Finally, it will be evaluated whether it is possible for commanders to have effective control over their (non-human) subordinates and, based on this, whether command responsibility as a solution should prima facie be excluded or not.

**Federica Merenda** (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, HIDEANDOLA - Project 101049699, Funded by the European Union), *Individual Criminal Responsibility to reconcile ourselves with the reality of international crimes: an outdated paradigm in the era of killer robots? An Arendtian account AI*



Funded by the  
European Union

As the conscience of humankind was outraged by the “barbarous acts” committed during World War II, Public International Law went under a process of serious renovation through the creation of the so-called “cosmopolitan regimes of international law”, that is those legal regimes which attribute rights and duties to individuals and states in their mutual relations, so as to consider individuals as moral agents and legal subjects notwithstanding their belonging to a certain political community.

Among these regimes, International Criminal Law was created in the belief that the ex-post facto ascertainment of individual criminal responsibility over committing international crimes (a form of retrospective responsibility) could constitute a way for the international community as a whole to reconcile itself with the reality of, inter alia, the severe International Humanitarian Law and qualified Human Rights violations committed during the armed conflict, and to “feel at the home in the world” again.

Arendt's reflections on the Eichmann's trial and more specifically on the bureaucratization and mechanization of the Nazi system are pivotal in describing the reasons why the need was felt to create new norms according to which obedience to superior orders could not be considered as a justification for committing international crimes and from which the need to consider every subject involved in the hostilities always as a moral agent responsible for their actions descended. Moral agency in this sense constitutes the pre-requisite of criminal responsibility.

As of today, the possible substitution of human soldiers with Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), that is, with Artificial Intelligence (AI) machines endowed with automated decision-making abilities can have a disruptive impact on such system.

The introduction of AI in such a scenario indeed creates a responsibility gap that is thoroughly analysed in the relevant legal literature: as direct intent could not be identified, it would be unjustifiable to place individual criminal responsibility over subjects who are just indirectly connected to the possible crime; at the same time, to ascertain the individual criminal responsibility of a machine as if it were a human subject would not seem to satisfy any demand for justice.

Is then the introduction of AWS in military scenarios at odds with the idea of having a legal system in place which is ultimately reliant on individual responsibility as a grounding concept? What principles underneath the current legal system does the introduction of AI in military scenarios elucidates and how do they relate with responsibility?

In this paper, I investigate such question from the perspective of Arendtian cosmopolitanism, drawing insights from International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, and arguing that such responsibility gap not only brings about most relevant legal consequences undermining the execution of connected international legal regimes – as those analysed in the relevant existing literature - but, from a political theory perspective, is at odds with the very cosmopolitan principles that such legal regimes were created to enshrine so as to constitute the safeguards to prevent a possible dehumanization of law, as that purported by the Nazi regime, from being realized again.

## Panel 11: Intersections

1st October | 11.00-13.00 | Teatro Vittoria

**Anna Menzel (Goethe Universität Frankfurt), *Alteritätsethische Verantwortung des Rechts als Frage des Hören-Könnens vor dem Antworten-Müssen***

In alteritätsethischer Hinsicht zeichnet sich Verantwortung als Bedingung responsiver Subjektwerdung aus. Diese responsive Subjektwerdung, die vom unentrinnbaren Schicksal gekennzeichnet ist, der Anderen Antworten zu müssen, skizziere ich in meinem Dissertationsprojekt

als *conditio humana* des Rechts (Lévinas, Butler). Es steht unter dem Arbeitstitel „Hören-Können vor dem Antworten müssen – Überlegungen zur alteritätsethischen Relevanz des Hörens und Gehört-Werdens im Recht“. Hören-Können denke ich einerseits als Ausdruck der Verletzlichkeit einer leiblich bedingten Existenz in der Welt. Andererseits ist Hören insofern eine alteritätsethisch und hermeneutisch wirkmächtige soziale Praxis, weil sie in

einem Kulturkreis, der lange Zeit von einem Primat des Sehens bzw. Sprechens geprägt war, performative Voraussetzung ist, um überhaupt Sprechen zu können (Spivak). Im Sinne eines gekonnten Hörens ist außerdem die Relevanz eines feinen gestimmten Gehörs adressiert, welches ein differentes Verständnis, das die Andere zunächst hört, ohne sie (in übergreifiger Weise) verstehen zu müssen, begünstigt.

Als Rechtstheoretikerin kommt es mir in diesem Feld darauf an zu fragen, inwiefern Recht im Zusammenspiel von Ethik, Politik und Recht, dort aufgerufen ist, wo die Sphäre des Politischen versagt. Ein alteritätsethischer Rechtsinn könnte es meines Erachtens, in Anschluss an Butlers Überlegungen zur Betrauerbarkeit, sein, eine Fair-Teilung von Aufmerksamkeit zu ermöglichen.

Insofern könnte er als Antwort auf die alteritätsethische Überforderung gelten, als einzelnes Subjekt dem vielstimmigen Anspruch all der Anderen gerecht zu werden. Nicht, indem ein solches normatives Rahmenwerk alteritätsethisch gerechte Antworten vorzeichnen oder geben könnte, aber indem es Räume des Hörens und Gehört-Werdens öffnet und so unter Umständen die Übernahme alteritätsethischer Verantwortung befördert.

Diese Visionen sind für eine alteritätsethisch sensible Arbeit am und mit Recht derzeit so wichtig, weil es vor allem staatliches Recht ist, das für hinsichtlich ihrer Vulnerabilität besonders exponierte Personen und Wesen einschneidend als geltend erfahren wird. Unter einer alteritätsethischen Perspektive zeichnet sich dieses Recht als die Inszenierung einer alteritätsethischen Antwortordnung aus, die jedoch ihre eigenen Bedingungen (in traumatischer Weise) verleugnet. Dies zeigen nicht zuletzt Narrative vorrechtlicher Naturzustände, die zur Recht-Fertigung und kulturellen Institutionalisierung von staatlichem Recht herangezogen worden und die von Butler als Souveränitäts-(Phantasma) analysiert wurden.

Wird die Wirkmacht alternativer Narrative ernstgenommen, stellt sich die Frage, welche Vorstellungen und Erzählungen ein alteritätsethisch sensibleres Recht stützen könnten. Wahrscheinlich kommen menschliche Subjekte oder andere Wesen darin vor, die um die eigene Abhängigkeit von Anderen wissen und dieser Verantwortung versuchen gerecht zu werden.

In der Präsentation würde ich mein Projekt gerne skizzieren und in diesem einzigartigen Forum zur Diskussion stellen.

**Corinna Eich (Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt), Gilles Deleuze'**  
***Ereignis: Ein bildungstiftender Raum für eine verantwortungsvolle Haltung?***

Die Annahme, dass eine Haltung der Verantwortung für andere Menschen und die Natur zentral für das Gelingen gemeinschaftlichen Lebens ist und zugleich notwendig, um auf gegenwärtige Krisen wie Klimawandel oder Coronapandemie zu reagieren, eröffnet erziehungs- und bildungswissenschaftlich relevante Fragestellungen: Wie können erziehungs- und bildungstiftende Settings Menschen dafür öffnen, sich entlang von

normativen Forderungen verantwortungsvoll zu verhalten und sich zugleich kritisch zu jenen Forderungen verhalten können? Stellt verantwortlich-Sein ein Bildungsziel dar oder ist die Verantwortung des Subjekts selbst ein konstitutives Moment dafür, dass Bildungsprozesse überhaupt geschehen können? Diese Fragen sind eng mit der Frage danach verbunden, welche Vorstellung von Subjekt angenommen wird. Zwar liegt dem Phänomen der Verantwortung bereits im Wort selbst (jemand antwortet und kann etwas ver-antworten) ein relationales Moment zugrunde, dennoch erscheint das verantwortlich agierende Subjekt autonom und selbstbestimmt. Gerade dieses Subjektverständnis verweist auf eine Vorstellung von Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung, die seitens zahlreicher Subjektkritiken des 21. Jahrhunderts (Foucault, Deleuze u.a.) kritisiert wurden. Dies hat bildungstheoretisches Denken stark herausgefordert, stellen dort doch traditionellerweise Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung sowohl Voraussetzung als auch Ziel von Bildungsprozessen dar. Im Zuge dieser Auseinandersetzung entstand das Konzept der Selbsttransformation als Bildungsprozess (Koller). In starker Ausrichtung an die Wirkmächtigkeit gesellschaftlicher Machtordnungen und gleichzeitig an der Möglichkeit des subversiven Verschiebens (Butler), zielen dort Bildungsprozesse als Selbst- und Welttransformation auf das emanzipatorische Potenzial der Veränderung bestehender Machtverhältnisse. Ich möchte in meinem Beitrag kritisch diskutieren, inwieweit das Konzept der Selbsttransformation schließlich doch in die Annahme eines autonomen Subjekts zurückfällt und sich damit das Phänomen der Verantwortung als problematisch erweist. Wird nämlich Transformation als Bildungsprozess gefasst und nicht Bildung als Befähigung, bestehende Missstände zu transformieren, läuft ein an diese Auffassung angelehnte Bildungspraxis Gefahr, ungleiche Zugangsmöglichkeiten zu verantwortungsbewusstem Handeln (kulturelles Kapital, existentielle Unversehrtheit u.a.) zu reproduzieren. Um auf diese Kritik zu antworten, möchte ich in meinem Vortrag das Konzept des Ereignisses von Deleuze/Guattari vorstellen und bildungstheoretisch anwenden. Meine These besteht darin, dass sich in Deleuze' Ereignis ein relationales Subjektverständnis zeigt, welches Verantwortlichkeit nicht in das einzelne Subjekt zurückverlagert, sondern eine daran ausgerichtete Bildungspraxis Ermöglichungsräume eröffnen kann, in denen voraussetzungslos neue Handlungsmöglichkeiten erfahrbar werden.

**Stella Synegianni (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena), *Nicht Schuld, sondern Verantwortung: über die nachträgliche Aufarbeitung eines ungesühnten Kriegsverbrechens***

Als 2015 ein Deutscher Journalist das Geheimnis seines Vaters nach dessen Tod erfuhr, entschied er sich dafür, die Wahrheit über die vom jungen Soldaten begangenen Taten im 2ten Weltkrieg auszusprechen. Der Wunsch des Sohnes, eine öffentliche Debatte über die Aufarbeitung der in der NS-Zeit begangenen Kriegsverbrechen anzustiften, wurde schnell

abgewürgt: wenige Stunden nach Erscheinen des Berichts, verlangte man von ihm, seinen Text aus der Öffentlichkeit zu entziehen.

Dennoch hat es sein Text doch in die Öffentlichkeit geschafft, und zwar in dem Land, wo sich der Vater des Journalisten der Kriegsverbrechen schuldig gemacht hatte. Anders als in seiner Heimat Deutschland, reagierten die Leser in Griechenland mit einem spontanen Überfluss von Dankbarkeit. Söhne der Überlebenden am Ort des Massakers meldeten sich zu Wort. Es begann ein Dialog, der sich für beide Seiten als befreiend erwies. Die öffentliche Beichte des Journalisten, der sich in die Betroffenen hineinversetzte und bereit erklärte, für die Taten seines Vaters *Verantwortung* zu übernehmen, wirkte „wie Balsam auf die durch den Krieg entstandenen Wunden“. Eine pragmatische Folge im Sinne der Kriegsreparationen hatte diese Geste nicht – sie leistete jedoch einen Beitrag, die Anti-Deutsche Stimmung in Griechenland zu entschärfen.

Dieses Ereignis wurde von einem Experten in Themen „Verzeihung und Versöhnung“ kommentiert. Der Jenaer Philosoph Prof. Dr. **Klaus-Michael Kodalle** sah in diesem Bericht ein Novum bei der Aufarbeitung der NS-Vergangenheit. Während die meisten Nachfolger der NS-Soldaten sich auf die *Gnade der späten Geburt* beriefen, um sich von der Schuld der Eltern frei zu machen, entschied sich der Berliner Journalist dafür, freiwillig für die vom Vater begangenen Taten einzustehen. Dies erinnert stark daran, was **Hegel** zufolge, das wichtigste Merkmal des tragischen Helden ausmacht: der Wille, für etwas zu haften, das man selbst nicht begangen hat – und zwar aus Liebe.

In dieser Geschichte von Anerkennung der Schuld, Bereitschaft, Konsequenzen zu tragen, und Wunsch nach Wiedergutmachung, lassen sich Schritte wiederfinden, die ein Kernelement der griechischen Tragödie ausmachen. Der Held befindet sich laut Hegel in einer Situation, die aus Schuld und Unschuld gemischt ist, wie die vererbte Schuld der Kinder durch Schandtaten ihrer Eltern. Während die meisten Menschen sagen würden „Ich war das nicht, es war nicht meine Schuld“, entscheidet sich der Held der Tragödie freiwillig, dafür einzustehen, *obwohl* es nicht seine eigene Tat war. Hegel behauptet, anders als die meisten Tragödieninterpreten seiner Zeit, diese Schuld sei keine, die das Individuum wie ein feindliches Schicksal zerschmettert, sondern ein Fehler, der *korrigiert* werden könnte.

Im Vortrag soll die Rede des Journalisten mit dem **Korrektur**prozess der Tragischen Schuld verglichen werden. Dabei werden Begriffe, mit denen die griechische Sprache dieses Vorgehen beschreibt, analysiert: 1. **Schuld** (**ενοχή**) als eine Last **im** eigenen Selbst. 2. **Apologie** als *Aussprechen* und *Loswerden* dieser Last. 3. **Verantwortung** als die Verbindlichkeit für Gegenwart und Zukunft, etwas „*wieder gerade zu machen*“.

Das Prinzip *Verantwortung* wird schließlich im Kontext der Philosophie Kodalles als der Schritt untersucht, der den Weg hin zur Verzeihung und *Versöhnung* vorbereitet.

## Panel 12: Political and economic responsibility

1st October | 11.00-13.00 | Sala Olimpica

### **Hannah McHugh (University College London), *Rescuing the role of blame in political responsibility***

Should we blame agents for their contributions to and role in structural injustices and domination? Existing accounts of political responsibility seek to divorce the role of blame. Against this, in this paper I argue that reactive attitudes develop our sensitivity to moral and political reasons, and thereby motivate both individual and collective action. Further, removing blame implies a misconstrued disconnectedness between agential actions and structural injustice. I defend rescuing the role of blame.

In the examinations of structural injustice and domination from Young and in recent republican accounts, we can see some *prima facie* reasons to separate blame and responsibility<sup>8</sup>. Many of the features of the ways agents interact with structural injustice appear to be exemptions or excuses from being blameworthy, such as remoteness from harm, the size of a contribution to injustice, or because of the seemingly morally innocuous nature of these actions when taken alone. I argue, contrarily, that blame is attributable precisely for failing in a structural responsibility and not for any particular interpersonal responsibility. Agents have political responsibilities which are not defined solely in terms of a particular outcome of harm to another agent, from which we may be excused or exempted from blame. There is no remoteness between us and the way that our actions or inactions lend power to structural phenomena. This could be seen as the distinction between being blameworthy for contributing to a structure of patriarchy versus being blameworthy for the oppression of any particular woman. This aligns with recent republican literature highlighting the role of agents in the creation of sources of power which allows domination to persist.

Theories of moral responsibility do not divorce the role of blame. Drawing on reason-responsive theories of a Strawsonian origin and recent signalling theories of blame<sup>9</sup>, this paper defends blame as a reactive attitude with a signalling function that can be attributed to agents of whom better future behaviour can be demanded. The paper will align with recent literature seeking to establish that blame has a role in developing our sensitivities to normative reasons<sup>10</sup>. The paper contends both that there is no necessity for blame to be omitted from an account of political responsibility and that doing so creates deficiencies.

The paper argues, firstly, we should rescue blame because a purely forward-looking conception of responsibility, absent of blame, produces what Nussbaum has termed a 'moral-free pass': that agents have a responsibility presently but are never blameworthy for

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<sup>8</sup> (Young, 2011, Gadeke 2021).

<sup>9</sup> (e.g. Shoemaker & Vargas, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> (e.g. Pettit & McGeer, 2015).

failing to take this up<sup>11</sup>. This poses issues for motivation to take political moral action. Secondly, blame is key in the development of our moral and normative reasoning as well as our ability to effect political and personal change such as is required to undermine dominating or unjust sources of power. Finally, rescuing blame as part of a conception of political responsibility is important for its ability to make opaque structures transparent. In particular, in cases where norms are emerging. This paper will therefore contribute to the recent literature on political responsibility, structural domination and small status harms such as microaggressions by offering a practical normative approach regarding how we ought to react to contributions to structural injustice and domination.

**Jasmine Khin (Northwestern University), *Corporate accountability and political responsibility under the United Nations human rights framework***

In this paper, I explore the question, who is responsible for keeping powerful Multinational Corporations (MNCs) accountable for human rights violations? I start from the premise that there is a general consensus established by the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) that corporations have the responsibility to respect international human rights norms under the framework of “protect, respect, and remedy”. According to the UNGP, businesses have the obligation to conduct due diligence to “manage potential and adverse human rights impact” in their operations<sup>12</sup>. The fact that this document was endorsed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) shows that global governance institutions have taken seriously the issue of human rights violations in business operations. However, a well-known fact is that even after the document has been accepted by the international community, human rights violations continue to take place, especially in developing countries where state regulations for human rights protection are weak or lacking. Using the example of the Rana Plaza collapse which killed at least 1,132 people and injured more than 2500 and its aftermath<sup>13</sup>, I show that the due diligence required by the UNGP is not enough by itself to prevent future tragedies and violations of workers’ rights. The accountability mechanisms such as the Accord for Fire and Building Safety (Accord) and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance)– the products of cooperation between private and public actors– generated in hindsight<sup>14</sup> are helpful and necessary but are an instance of retrospective (backward looking) responsibility.

<sup>11</sup> (Nussbaum, 2009, 141-142).

<sup>12</sup> “Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence – Identifying and Leveraging Emerging Practices,” OHCHR, accessed April 30, 2022.

<sup>13</sup> “The Rana Plaza Accident and Its Aftermath,” The Rana Plaza Accident and its aftermath, December 21, 2017, [https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/geip/WCMS\\_614394/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/geip/WCMS_614394/lang--en/index.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Saxena, Sanchita Banerjee, “How do we understand the Rana Plaza disaster and what must be done to prevent future tragedies” in Labor, *Global Supply Chains, and the Garment Industry in South Asia: Bangladesh after the Rana Plaza* (Taylor and Francis Group: 2019)

However, I argue, to achieve the protection of human rights worldwide, our normative framework must include and integrate the idea of prospective (forward looking) responsibility to supplement existing and future accountability mechanisms. To this end, I employ Iris Marion Young's Social Connection Model (SCM) of responsibility<sup>15</sup> to argue that the moral and legal responsibility of businesses to respect human rights must be supplemented by the political responsibility of the international community to keep them accountable for their actions on the ground.

The aim of the paper is to connect the current literature on human rights norms in global governance with the concept of political responsibility (which is a specific kind of collective, moral, and forward-looking responsibility). I draw upon the political conception of human rights given by Cristina Lafont and Charles Beitz<sup>16</sup> which allows me to argue from the existing practice of human rights in international institutions and its normative foundations. On the other hand, I want to show that there is space from a normative perspective and a practical need for (collective and forward) political responsibility for human rights in order to achieve the end of human rights accountability by international business institutions.

**Silvia Donzelli (Bielefeld University), *Responsibility for complicity: the problem of "neutral" business transactions***

The legal concept of complicity refers to a form of retrospective responsibility for the aid, encouragement or support knowingly provided to the harmful actions of a perpetrator.

A particularly challenging form of complicity arises from the fact, that through everyday business activities one can - typically without wishing to do so - support injustices, harms and even human rights violations. Under which conditions a business-related agent is to be held accountable for complicity is subject of controversial debates in business ethics as well as in domestic and international criminal law.

The core idea that actions performed in the working context should enjoy a kind of immunity from accountability for complicity is discussed in German criminal law using the concept of "neutral actions" (neutrale Handlungen) and moreover in the English-speaking literature about the responsibility of shopkeepers.

The alleged moral and legal neutrality of business-related complicity is backed by various arguments. For instance, business agents seem to lack the intentionality requirement, since they support harm while "just doing their job". However, it remains open whether the intentionality requirement should be understood as purpose or as knowledge. The question

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<sup>15</sup> See: Young, Iris Marion, "A Social Connection Model" in *Responsibility for Justice* (Oxford University Press, 2011)

<sup>16</sup> See: Lafont, Cristina, "Global Governance and Human Rights" in *Spinoza Lectures* (2011) & Beitz, Charles, *The Idea of Human Rights*, (Oxford University Press, 2009).

of a possible epistemic duty to know, or rather to be informed about the possible implication of business conduct arises.

Other arguments point to the lack of causality between the business-related action and harm: First, the support delivered by the business transaction is mostly no necessary condition for, nor significant contribution to the harm; second, giving up the business transaction would generally not prevent the harmful action, since the perpetrator would possibly find another supplier or supporter.

Anyway, since the lack of purposeful intention as well as causal overdetermination and preemption are typical features of complicity cases, independently of whether they happen in the business context, the alleged neutrality of business-related transactions remains an open question.

Moreover, the concept of complicity can be relevant in the business domain beyond issues of criminal accountability, as a tool for grounding prospective responsibility for due diligence. From this perspective, the question of responsibility should be posed ex-ante: pointing at the possibility of unwittingly supporting harm through business can be an effective way for preventing complicity, thus eroding the support that harmful practices often require.

In my contribution, the idea that business transactions should enjoy a special status relating to issues of responsibility for complicity will be analyzed and rebutted, critically considering different positions from criminal law and moral philosophy. The development of normative standards of accountability in international criminal law as well as current tendencies in defining guidelines for multinational corporations vis-à-vis human rights violations will be explored.

Normatively relevant differences between one-time and systemic harm, as well as between the responsibility of a shop-keeper and that of big enterprises will be considered, as well as the challenge of distinguishing the thin line between supporting a perpetrator (for instance, through money or food) and supporting her harmful actions.

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### **Panel 13: Responsibility and Law**

*1st October | 15.00-17.00 | Sala Olimpica*

#### **Miriam Gassner-Olechowski (University of Vienna), *Responsibility in legal philosophy and international law after WWI***

Responsibility necessitates a multidisciplinary approach. Responsibility can not only arise from civil law or criminal law, but also from international law, where the terms up to our days play a key role in settling conflicts among states. Especially the five Paris Peace Treaties,

ending WWI, became a perfect example of the importance of these terms in international law and showed what consequences can arise from state responsibility.

In my presentation „Responsibility in legal philosophy and international law after WWI“ I would like to talk about Responsibility in International Law, namely in the Paris Peace Treaties on the one hand and on how the legal philosophical doctrines that were predominant at the end of WWI have influenced the Paris Peace Treaties, over all the Treaty of Sèvres, on the other hand.

**Camille Van Peteghem (PhD Candidate and FWO Fellow at KU Leuven Law Faculty and Visiting Researcher at Yale Law School), *Responsibility in Diversity: questions of cultural communication in the construction of contracts***

In culturally diverse societies, different contractual actors hold culturally divergent expectations. As a result, cultural conflicts emerge in the construction of contractual meaning. Contract law relies on so-called ‘objective’ norms, such as ‘reasonableness’, which are based on the assumption that all contractual parties share a cultural framework. In diverse societies, however, parties act on different assumptions of reasonableness prevalent in their own culture. Applying supposedly ‘objective’ standards risks undermining parties’ actual intentions and it tends to do so in a way that structurally discriminates against cultural minorities.

Relational contract theory provides a framework for solutions that respect cultural diversity. The legal mechanism of custom or usage allows for increased cultural differentiation in the construction of contractual meaning. Specific relational norms within the contracting community are used to interpret and supplement the contractual text. Consequently, it becomes crucial to establish the relevant cultural community for a specific contract. When parties disagree on the relevant cultural context, a question of responsibility emerges: when do contractual parties in a culturally diverse society have the responsibility to know or inquire about the other party’s cultural framework? My paper deals with dividing this burden of intercultural communication in contractual relations.

To approach this topic, I take a social justice approach to contract law, framing contracts not just as a private tool of individual autonomy, but as crucial instruments for public justice. Not only do contractual transactions significantly impact the (economic) position of individuals in the public sphere, the way in which contract law is constructed also reflects and co-constitutes our image of the public. This normative framework is inspired by cultural sociology, specifically Jeffrey Alexander’s work on the civil sphere. Alexander conceptualizes contract law as a ‘regulatory institution’ that co-creates a cohesive civil sphere. The central research question can thus be framed as: how should we distribute responsibility for intercultural communication in contractual relations in a way that fosters inclusion in a culturally diverse society?

To answer this question, I will draw from existing doctrines that divide intercultural burdens. I will review (1) literature on trade usages to investigate the division of communicative burdens between commercial contracting communities and (2) literature on reasonable accommodations for cultural minorities in other legal areas. I will aim to answer the following sub-questions: (1) What are the criteria to divide the intercultural burden? (*descriptive*); Why are these criteria used? (*explanatory*); How do these criteria and reasons relate to the objective of creating a cohesive civil sphere in a culturally diverse society? (*evaluative*); What can be inferred from this for the resolution of intercultural conflicts in contract law? (*normative*). U.S. law will serve as a starting point, but comparative insights will be used to draw broader theoretical conclusions.

The goal is to establish criteria that re-balance the construction of contractual meaning in a way that involves a level of care towards vulnerable cultural minorities. This way, I aim to inject a sense of public responsibility into a field that is traditionally marked by private concerns.

### **Minni Leskinen (University of Turku), Responsibility in doing feminist *de lege ferenda* research**

For the last four years I have been working on my doctoral dissertation on sexual offences. It has been an interesting journey for several reasons, not the least for the fact that in Finland, the Government proposition to amend the law on sexual offences to explicitly cover all nonconsensual acts has only been given two months ago. This means that for the four years I have been working on something that did not yet exist, arguing for a consent-based legislation that would take into consideration various power imbalances, thinking about different options, looking what was done in other countries (mainly Sweden and Germany) and inside the framework of Istanbul Convention through country monitoring. The aim of my research has always been openly feminist – to improve the situation of victims of sexual violence through better legislation – but I still do think that my work is legal and scientific, not mere politics (unless we think politics in an Arendtian sense).

The conditions of my own work, doing feminist *de lege ferenda* research, have troubled me a great deal, especially when trying to argue for persons in vulnerable positions. Who am I to say what kind of legislations would best protect the vulnerable and guarantee their self-determination? Who am I to tell which compromises between feminist aims and the principles of criminalization would still be acceptable? When making a claim what the law should be, am I not taking the same problematic omniscient position that the feminist project tries to dismantle? Especially, because *de lege ferenda* research typically takes its legitimation from the legal system itself (enhancing coherence, closing gaps etc.), and feminist legal research typically tries to deconstruct or expose hidden discourses, traditional *de lege ferenda* research and feminism seem not to have too much in common. How can I then present my conclusions as legitimate from legal and from feminist point of view?

The notion that comes to mind and combines both point of views is justice. In the end, I am trying to argue for something that would be just – or at least more just. Both in legal theory and philosophy there are several theories on justice, all more or less unsatisfying. In Finland, thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas or Jacques Derrida, have been quite influential among legal philosophers and theorists: a just law is either a matter of discursive rationality of like-minded lawyers or an aporia. In my work, I have turned to feminist philosophy to have a different answer that would both give hope that a just law is possible and keep the discussion open for the voices of others. Inspired by the way philosopher Sara Heinämaa reads Luce Irigaray and Adriana Cavarero's work on narration, I attempt to sketch an understanding of *de lege ferenda* research as a constant act of wondering, loving and narrating.

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### **Panel 14: Foundations of responsibility**

1st October | 15.00-17.00 | Teatro Vittoria

**Chiara Magni (University of Roma Tre/Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne),**  
***Kant, Hegel e il diritto di costringere: indagine sulla fondazione moderna della "responsabilità" giuridica***

Diritto *civile* e diritto *penale* hanno il loro fondamento in una *normatività* che ascrive responsabilità al soggetto agente. In assenza di uno sfondo a carattere 'prescrittivo', i soggetti non sarebbero all'origine di 'azioni', ma soltanto di trasformazioni descrittive del mondo. In tal senso, è necessario stabilire le *condizioni* in virtù delle quali un soggetto può essere considerato giuridicamente (e moralmente) responsabile. A partire da una prospettiva storico-filosofica, il contributo in questione si propone di indagare due diverse teorie della "responsabilità", entro i limiti della sua declinazione "giuridica": i *Primi principi metafisici della dottrina del diritto* (Kant) e i *Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto* (Hegel). In particolare, si desidera mettere in luce l'originale interpretazione, sviluppata da questi due autori, del nesso (tradizionale) libertà/costrizione (*Zwang*), nonché il modo in cui essa contribuisce a definire il concetto di responsabilità giuridica, al fine di individuarne la portata per la storia del pensiero giusfilosofico.

1. In un primo tempo si cercherà di mostrare l'evoluzione operata da Kant rispetto alla tradizione giusnaturalistica del Settecento, in base a quanto segue: (i) se il *Naturrecht* tedesco, in particolare quello di derivazione wolffiana, faceva del diritto un sistema di doveri la cui obbligatorietà risiedeva "*vel in premium vel in poenas*" (Achenwall, *Ius naturae*, § 14), Kant fa della libertà un *imperativo* della ragione, che non si limita a prescrivere come *doverosa* un'azione, ma che è altresì in grado di imporsi *effettivamente* all'arbitrio, in qualità di *obbligazione* (*Verbindlichkeit*). (ii) Egli introduce così un *criterio* della libertà della stessa natura di essa – sotto forma di 'autocoazione' della ragione –, svincolandola dal postulato

eudemonistico del giusnaturalismo, il quale aveva fondato il *quid sit ius* sulla base di un mero criterio *empirico* riconducibile a norme dal presunto valore *antropologico* (come la felicità, la perfezione, la socialità); (iii) Ciò, inoltre, non consentiva al giusnaturalismo di distinguere adeguatamente tra morale e diritto, partizione che Kant fonda non tanto sul tipo di dovere, quanto piuttosto sull'inclusione/esclusione del *movente*: giuridica sarà la legislazione che non tiene conto della massima soggettiva e guarda solo all'azione. (iv) Si esaminerà dunque la formulazione kantiana del diritto come "concordanza dell'universale coazione reciproca con la libertà di ognuno" (MS, § E), in virtù della quale la libertà – e dunque la responsabilità – giuridica del soggetto è legata *analiticamente* alla possibilità della coercizione esterna.

2. In un secondo momento si analizzerà l'hegeliano 'diritto astratto' (il diritto in senso stretto), evidenziando come la sezione iniziale dei *Lineamenti* sia (anche) una critica alla prima parte della *Metafisica dei costumi*: per Hegel, infatti, solo *a posteriori* (GPhR, § 94 A) il diritto astratto può essere definito uno *Zwangrecht*. Si esaminerà quindi il tipo di 'responsabilità' specificamente giuridica elaborata da Hegel: essa trova la propria ragion d'essere, a sua volta, nella coincidenza di diritto e dovere, la quale tuttavia si sostanzia di un punto di vista 'inter-personale', perdendo quel carattere *formale* connesso all'*analiticità* della coazione esterna, e attestandosi quale rapporto di *riconoscimento* reciproco, guadagno spirituale dell'uomo quale volontà che si *ri-flette* come libera.

**Ilaria Ferrara (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici), *The Kantian Approach to vulnerability: an epistemological-moral reflection between illness, responsibility and fragility***

The aim of this paper is to deepen the Kantian theme of mental illness, which consist in deviation of the faculty of knowledge, through an interdisciplinary approach between psychology, anthropology and moral philosophy and introducing the discourse into the contemporary debate on vulnerability. Firstly, I will consider the operations of reason not from its practical self-determination or according to the laws of obligation, but through the determinations of acting beyond the moral law. In this sense, I will analyze the causality of the reasoning in various pathology of mind, described by Kant in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*. This part of my paper will investigate the cognitive aspect of mental illnesses, and thus it will focus on some epistemological issues of the critical philosophy. Through a study of logical prejudice, used to indicate the way in which the healthy reason makes mistakes and interferes correctly formulated judgments, I will try to show how mental illnesses are cognitive variations of a particular kind, which can open to a dangerous logical selfishness. The third part of the paper will focus on passions [*Leidenschaften*] and affections [*Affekten*], understood as diseases of the will, in their relation with the principle of moral responsibility. The argumentation will highlight the impact that affections and passions have on the practical decision. I will investigate the differences between the affects, absolutely

disruptive and unable to maintain a relationship with reflection, and the passions, capable of giving themselves a principle of determining the action. From here, the paper will clarify a new - and problematic - model of subject, starting from a reevaluation of mental illness, not only considered from an anthropological point of view. Then, I will examine a more articulated concept of Kantian autonomy and personality [*Persönlichkeit*] starting from the notion of degrees of responsibility in a judgment of imputation, analyzing the meaning of human fragility [*fragilitas*] and infirmity [*infirmitas*]. Finally, I will analyze the Kantian position on the legal protection of weak individuals, women and minority, as well as sick persons, examining Kant's view on their *status personae* and their existential and personal rights, in relation to the issue of the moral foundation of legal status. In the end, I will try to take part in the contemporary debate on vulnerability and mental illnesses, starting from the traditional criticism of the concept of autonomy (in liberal sense), understood as the political right to self-determination. The main purpose of my paper will be to examine one of the theoretical assumptions of the debate on autonomy, i.e. that autonomy is incompatible with severe mental disorder. The final goal of the paper will be to consider the current relevance of the Kantian approach in in political ethics and law, in particular starting from the deconstruction of the monolithic concept of subjectivity and autonomy, to arrive at a theory of vulnerability as the basis for a review of the principle of institutional action.

**Giulia Battistoni (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici/University of Verona),**  
***Grounding Responsibility: Kant's and Hegel's approach in light of the state of necessity***

What does individual responsibility for committed actions ground on? What are the (subjective? – objective?) criteria for determining the moral and/or legal value of an action and the corresponding imputation and responsibility of the agent?

Kant's and Hegel's moral philosophies, even if opposed to each other for many aspects, help us to answer these questions and develop reflections on moral and legal responsibility which are still of value today, in particular with reference to the states of necessity and/or emergency.

On the one side, Kant argues that we cannot have any control or knowledge of the consequences of our actions, that remain unpredictable: for this reason, they cannot serve as a parameter for evaluating the morality of our actions themselves. What matters in Kant's approach is, as is well known, that the moral law is unconditionally valid and as such should be followed regardless of the concrete context of the action and its possible consequences. Hegel's perspective leads, on the other side, to the awareness that the attribution of responsibility cannot depend solely on subjective, solipsistic conditions of acting, but also grounds on objective determinations, which find maximum expression in the ethical community. As a consequence, Hegel considers both the purely deontological perspective and the consequentialist one deficient. In the evaluation of an action and the responsibility

of the agent both the *principles of the individual*, together with its ability to self-determination and to be self-legislator of themselves, in a Kantian sense, *and* the *consideration of the context* of the action as well as of its consequences are constitutive. Moreover, the sensitive element that characterizes both the internal nature of the human being (their impulses and desires, which must be included in their nature as rational beings) as well as the nature external to them, which must be presupposed to their action and which contributes to modify it and determine its consequences, have to be taken into account when it comes to define responsibility.

Starting from this context, my paper will bring to light the main differences between the Kantian and the Hegelian approaches with respect to moral action and responsibility: I will first deal with the Kantian writing "On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns", in order to reflect on the more general question whether it is possible to admit legitimate exceptions to the moral principle and to deontological ethics from a Kantian standpoint. I will then focus on some states of necessity, as they are understood by Kant and Hegel, in order to discuss in what sense they might (or not) legitimate the agent to act in ways that would normally be considered immoral and illegal, thus playing a crucial role in the question of grounding responsibility.

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Battistoni Giulia (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici/University of Verona)

*Grounding Responsibility: Kant's and Hegel's approach in light of the state of necessity*

Berseneva Maja (Freie Universität Berlin)

*The responsible relationship of self and other in Levinas*

Bstiel Michaela (University of Innsbruck)

*Radikale Alterität und Verantwortung. Eine ethisch-politische Relektüre mit Levinas und Butler*

Castagliuolo Giulia/Olgiati Paolo (University of Bologna/University of Torino)

*La responsabilità come presupposto dell'alleanza terapeutica: gli effetti della medicina difensiva in psichiatria*

D'Amore Elena (University of Pisa)

*Gioco e responsabilità*

Diamond Alma (NYU School of Law)

*Membership and owning up to collective harms*

Donzelli Silvia (Bielefeld University)

*Responsibility for complicity: the problem of "neutral" business transactions*

Edmeads Luke (University of Brighton)

*Vulnerability and suffering: Mimetic relations of responsibility in Butler and Adorno*

Eich Corinna (Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)

*Gilles Deleuze' Ereignis: Ein bildungstiftender Raum für eine verantwortungsvolle Haltung?*

Ferrara Ilaria (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici)

*The Kantian Approach to vulnerability: an epistemological-moral reflection between illness, responsibility and fragility*

Franco Vittoria (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa)

*Responsabilità come dotazione di soggettività*

Gassner-Olechowski Miriam (University of Vienna)

*Responsibility in legal philosophy and international law after WWI*

Gómez Ana C. (Purdue University)

*Conditions of legal responsibility: the case of Colombia*

Göttsche Sandra (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

*Taking responsibility. Reducing refugees' structural vulnerabilities accessing social services*

de Gruisbourne Birte (Institute of Media Studies, University of Paderborn)

*Inclination, responsibility and the autonomizing structure of care*

Hartz Friederike (University of Cambridge)

*Changing responsibilities in a warming world: Climate science and its role in activism*

Hiller Sarah (Free University of Berlin/Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research)

*Responsibility without causation – Probability raising as an independent desert base*

Huzar Timothy J. (King's College London)

*Being present to vulnerability: Uniqueness and responsibility in Butler, Cavarero and Lewis*

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*Algorithmic fairness and structural injustice: insights from feminist political philosophy*

Khin Jasmine (Northwestern University)

*Corporate accountability and political responsibility under the United Nations human rights framework*

Leskinen Minni (University of Turku)

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Magni Chiara (University of Roma Tre/Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)  
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*La responsabilità impossibile dopo e oltre Freud*

McHugh Hannah (University College London)  
*Rescuing the role of blame in political responsibility*

Menzel Anna (Goethe Universität Frankfurt)  
*Alteritätsethische Verantwortung des Rechts als Frage des Hören-Könnens vor dem Antworten-Müssen*

Merenda Federica (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, HIDEANDOLA - Project 101049699, Funded by the European Union)  
*Individual Criminal Responsibility to reconcile ourselves with the reality of international crimes: an outdated paradigm in the era of killer robots? An Arendtian account AI*

Oimann Ann-Katrien (Royal Military Academy of Belgium/KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy)  
*Moral responsibility and LAWS: the importance of the control-requirement*

Pavlakos Nikolaos (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)  
*Willensfreiheit und normativer Schuldbegriff: Eine interdisziplinäre Untersuchung zwischen Naturwissenschaften, Philosophie und Strafdogmatik*

Poli Edoardo (University of Pisa)  
*Un invito alla vulnerabilità: per un'etica del perdono*

Safouane Hamza (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)  
*A claim for agency: From guests to hosts in Jordan's refugee camps - Notes from the field*

Schubert Karsten (Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg)  
*Epistemic responsibility. Transforming knowledge as democratization*

Stéphan Alix (University College Dublin)

*The conditions of responsibility: Derrida and Kierkegaard in front of the call of the Other*

Surace Valentina (University of Messina)

*Judith Butler: la responsabilità al di là dei limiti della sola legge e del volere libero*

Synegianni Stella (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena)

*Nicht Schuld, sondern Verantwortung: über die nachträgliche Aufarbeitung eines ungesühnten Kriegsverbrechens*

Valdés Alicia (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

*The act of coalitions. A political praxis from vulnerability and responsibility*

Van Peteghem Camille (PhD Candidate and FWO Fellow at KU Leuven Law Faculty and Visiting Researcher at Yale Law School)

*Responsibility in Diversity: questions of cultural communication in the construction of contracts*

Vantini Lucia (University of Verona)

*L'intreccio tra etica della cura e antropologia della vulnerabilità: un'altra grammatica della giustizia*

Vögele Hannah (Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics, University of Brighton)

*My body, my responsibility? Bodily self-ownership, vulnerability and responsibility*

Yudanin Michael (Brīvā Universitāte/Free University, Riga, Latvia)

*Responsibility to the past, present, and future*

Zucca-Soest Sabrina (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

*Verantwortung und Konsens*